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The Department of Defense continuously seeks to improve the product 
development effort for its weapon systems.  As the complexity of those systems 
increases, so does the importance of the test and evaluation process.  All 
Services are victims of poor performance in the independent Operational 
Evaluation of their respective weapon systems.  The drive to deliver products 
rapidly to the Warfighter reduces the prospect for success in Operational Test.  
Years of neglect and funding reductions have resulted in a decaying test 
infrastructure.  The acquisition community’s failure to consistently apply lessons 
learned and best business practices ensures repeating the mistakes.  The US 
Navy embarked on an aggressive six-year development effort to retrofit the aging 
High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile with advanced technology and net-centric 
enabling systems.  This Sea Power 21 weapon requires a test strategy that can 
effectively verify and evaluate product maturity before independent operational 
testing. By applying best business practices, lessons learned, and understanding 
the current state of affairs with respect to the range infrastructure, the Advanced 
Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Test and Evaluation Integrated Product Team can 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
While the US has some of the most superior and highest quality weapons, 
repeated cost and schedule overruns routinely mar the product development 
timeline.  These cost and schedule overruns normally lead to the destabilization 
of the programs and can cause a reduction in the unit buy (e.g., F/A-22), a 
reduction in funding to the program, or if severe enough, program cancellation 
(e.g., A-12 Avenger Program).  Program Managers (PM) strive to prevent or 
minimize the situations that create this program instability.  The Department of 
Defense (DoD) has funded and been the centerpiece of many studies to 
determine practices that optimize the product development timeline.   
DoD has made concerted efforts to improve product development, but the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) surmised in the FY01 and 
FY02 reports that the current trends in testing have systems beginning 
Independent Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) while still in an immature 
status.  “The cost of testing complex systems, as well as the risk of performance 
shortfalls delaying programs further, is motivating managers to skimp on testing.” 
(DOT&E, 2003, p.ii)  As a result, a majority of systems in Operational Evaluation 
(OPEVAL) experience stops in testing or operational assessment failures.  This 
was the case for the last High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) software 
upgrade program. The system was sent back to the Developmental Test (DT) 
community after operational test failures. Upon returning to the Operational Test 
(OT) phase, it still received a failing grade for specific capabilities.  This program 
failure, and those in other programs, translates into a combat capability lost or 
delayed resulting in increased risk to the Warfighter. 
   
B. PURPOSE 
This research supports the strategic development of a Test and Evaluation 
(T&E) strategy for a weapon system through the analysis of common problems 
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observed in a large-scale T&E program.  This research allows the test 
community to proactively meet those challenges thus mitigating the risk of failure 
during OPEVAL.  Historical facts show that a developing program risks failing OT 
if the challenges facing a test team during the developmental planning, 
execution, and analysis phases are not properly identified, assessed, and 
engaged.  With reduced resources in today’s acquisition world, it is unacceptable 
to ignore those challenges and fail to apply lessons learned from past programs.  
Throughout this paper, there are discussions and examples provided from 
various programs.  The AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile 
(AARGM) program is the primary case study.   
The US Navy has recently entered into System Development and 
Demonstration (SD&D) for the acquisition of an upgrade to the AGM-88 HARM 
weapon system.  This weapon system, designed to support the Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), is going through a major hardware and software 
upgrade.  The new system is called the AGM-88E AARGM.  This weapon system 
incorporates a new guidance and control section increasing its lethality and 
battlefield geographic specificity.  In addition, it includes “net-centric” enabling 
capabilities by incorporating enhanced targeting and Weapon’s Impact 
Assessment (WIA) information using the national support architecture. 
Incorporation of new weapon system components, program and test 
organizations, along with the use of a new contractor, means the T&E IPT must 
develop a test strategy that effectively and efficiently uses program resources to 
test the system at a level in DT that mitigates risk of failure during OPEVAL. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research provides insight to observed risks in OT.  It then discusses 
strategies to mitigate some of those key risks.  Research questions considered:   
• What are some of the dominant factors affecting DoD testing? 
• What have past studies offered as a means to help reform the T&E 
process? 
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• Can the application of commercial T&E Best Business Practices 
have a positive influence on government test process? 
• What failure trends can be identified throughout test programs? 
• What practices, processes, and planning can Developmental Test 
& Evaluation (DT&E) use to help acquisition programs succeed the 
first time they go into IOT&E? 
 
D. POTENTIAL BENEFIT FROM THIS STUDY 
This study will identify varying facets of the T&E process and will be 
utilized by the AGM–88E program manager and the test team during their 
strategic development efforts.  Understanding past T&E studies, best practices, 
and T&E lessons learned offers a wealth of knowledge to support the T&E 
strategy planning process.   Currently there is a T&E strategy in the program’s 
Single Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP).  It does not offer the depth 
required to effectively develop a plan for testing.  Additionally the current Test 
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) is incomplete.  While the document clearly 
defines the various stages of test and the time of execution, it is limited in depth 
with respect to a variety of essential test considerations.  Some of these 
considerations include the conduct of test, firing scenarios, decision process, and 
asset allocation.  Though it is not the scope of this research to directly answer all 
these considerations, this thesis will offer insight, allowing educated decisions to 
support the continued TEMP process.   Built upon a solid foundation of lessons 
learned, the AGM-88E test program, specifically the DT program, will deliver a 
mature product to the operational test community.  If that occurs, the program will 
meet its performance objectives, translating into an increased warfighting 
capability delivered on time.   
In addition to the direct benefit that this thesis will provide the AGM-88E 
program, this study provides a source of documentation to support the test 
planning process for other acquisition programs.  Although each program faces 
unique test challenges, there are common issues such as resource allocation 
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that must be resolved.  This thesis helps provide awareness to those generic 
issues, thereby increasing the knowledge base to effectively meet those 
challenges and limit their recurrence.   
 
E. SCOPE 
The research focuses on identifying various elements to consider in the 
process of developing a test strategy to reduce risk during OT.  The research is 
in five sections.  
• The first section introduces the research topic and provides a brief 
discussion of the current issues affecting T&E and the general 
efforts over the years to develop a more effective set of practices 
supporting improvement to the product development timeline.   
• The second section of the research focuses on the product 
development process and the relationship T&E plays in this 
process.  It addresses the test approach and discusses the 
differences between commercial and DoD testing.  The section 
additionally discusses the application of commercial best practices 
to the DoD T&E effort.  
• The third section addresses lessons learned from previous 
programs.  Trends are presented to the reader to highlight some 
key areas a tester must consider during the planning and execution 
of test.    This section identifies the importance of proper resource 
allocations and requirements control.  The section further discusses 
some of the key players with direct interests in a program and its 
success during testing.   
• The fourth section introduces the AGM-88E weapon system case 
study.  During this section, identified T&E risks are presented. 
Based on the research, a recommend path for the program is 
discussed.   
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• The final section presents recommendations, conclusions and 
offers suggestions for further study.   
 Based on the scope of this research, the reader will ascertain the general 
issues that affect the government team as it develops a product, with specific 
emphasis on the T&E process.  Past efforts designed to foster a more effective 
and efficient DoD test process are introduced throughout the reading.  Moreover, 
there is a discussion regarding the differences and difficulties applying 
commercial practices to DoD T&E.  Furthermore, the research provides an 
opportunity to see that a conscious effort is being made early in a weapon 
system’s development cycle to apply the best practices in test planning and 
execution of a major DoD acquisition program, to maximize the use and 
availability of limited resources.  While sections of this thesis are specific to the 
AGM-88E system, they will provide enough generalities to be applied or at a 
minimum considered in the strategic test planning for other systems.       
 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis was developed using the following methodology: 
• Literature reviews pertaining to T&E and product development; 
• Interviews from representatives of various test agencies and former 
and current PMs; 
• In-depth internet research pertaining to T&E, lessons learned, and 
acquisition documentation; and 
• Lessons learned from personal practice and experience. 
 
G. TESTING A SYSTEM TODAY 
Providing the best products to our military forces has always been a 
requirement in the US.  By society’s standards, it is unacceptable to send 
America’s military into combat with systems that do not work as intended. Yet, 
despite this commitment, there is a consistent trend within the DoD acquisition 
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community of not delivering products on time, within schedule, and within the 
proposed performance levels.  There have been some great successes such as 
the Air Force’s F-16 Fighting Falcon, but for every success there are the 
prominent failures.  One notable failure was the Navy’s A-12 Avenger program.   
A past President’s Scientific Advisory Committee stated the importance of 
T&E in the acquisition process.  In the report the committee stated,  
We regard the creation of the testing and evaluation group as of the 
utmost importance, since we believe most of our previous failures 
to be prepared for wars we fight would have been thoroughly 
exposed had an adequate program of testing and evaluation 
existed.  (Christie, 2002, speech) 
The committee further identified the necessity of providing sufficient financial 
resources to the T&E organization to support adequate testing.  They stated, 
The actual tests are very expensive and since the Testing and 
Evaluation budget in a Service is often in competition with funds for 
new equipment developments, we believe it is vital that the Test 
and Evaluation group in OSD have a substantial budget to allocate 
for tests. (Christie, 2002, speech)  
 Despite this recommendation, continued funding shortfalls prevent PM’s from 
adequately executing a test program.  Adding to the financial strain, the majority 
of funding to support the aging T&E infrastructure has transferred from 
institutional funding to program funding.  This financial burden drives the PM to 
make compromises in efforts to test a developing system. 
While support resources are being reduced, DoD continues to procure and 
drive for development and acquisition of more complex systems.  These systems 
offer increased combat capability, but also increase the complexity of conducting 
T&E.  Today’s systems are no longer stand-alone systems to be developed and 
tested with a stovepipe mentality. The Navy’s Sea Power 21 vision, which links 
information from various systems throughout the battlefield to support the 
Warfighter, as shown in Figure 1, has put a new interoperability requirement on 
all developing programs.  This requirement and the basic system level 
requirements dictate a robust test effort that stresses available resources.   
 
Figure 1.   Net-Centric Warfare 
 
DoD began many T&E process reforms to maximize the use of available 
resources and quickly transition programs from the design room to the war room.  
These reforms began in the early 1970s with a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.  This 
panel looked at acquisition policies and practices with respect to cost, schedule, 
and performance.  Citing their findings, the current Director for OT&E (DOT&E), 
the Honorable Mr. Thomas Christie said, the panel concluded that the acquisition 
policy was, “highly inflexible . . . and also based on the false premise that 
technological difficulties can be foreseen prior to the detailed engineering effort 
on specific hardware.” (Christie, 2004, speech)  The panel further recommended 
that prototyping, when applicable, be pursued in order to understand the 
technology and reduce the risk to the program’s development effort.   
In 1986, the Packard Commission conducted another review of the 
acquisition process.  In their final report, more than a dozen recommendations 
were proposed.  Two recommendations focused on DoD’s T&E process.  One 
recommendation supported the 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel study.  It 
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emphasized, “proof of technology by building and testing hardware, including 
system prototypes where appropriate, and incremental development of 
subsystems and components.” (DOT&E, 2002, ¶12)  The commission’s rationale, 
similar to the earlier study, was to reduce the technological risk of developing a 
new technology and to afford the PM an opportunity to conduct realistic cost 
estimates prior to full rate production.  The final report further recommended the 
OT community play a larger role earlier in the development cycle and maintain 
that role throughout full-scale development.  The Packard Commission believed 
that by exposing developers to the operational community earlier in the 
development cycle, there would be a higher probability the product performance 
would meet the operational needs.  
In the 1990’s, with the Cold War over and financial resources for defense 
declining, there were increased reform efforts to reduce the time it took from 
program inception to operational use. Shorter product cycle times result in a 
reduction in costs and schedules while steadily improving combat capability.  
Since 1993, there have been seven initiatives affecting change in the acquisition 
process and supporting the efficient procurement of weapons systems.  The final 
initiative was a complete cancellation and rewrite of the governing documents, 
which took place in 2002. (Rogers and Birmingham, 2004, pp. 47-48)  Now in 
2004, current regulations dictate defense acquisition plans give less guidance 
than ever before—less guidance on what to test; less on how to plan a T&E 
program; and less on how to document such planning in a TEMP. (Daly et al., 
2003, p.1)  Reduced guidance and more flexibility replaced the inflexibility sited 
in the 1970 study.  The PMs and more specifically the test agencies now have an 
opportunity to more effectively plan and execute a test program, but if they are 
not properly prepared for such freedom of execution, they could unwillingly lead a 
program down an inefficient path.     
 
H. IMPACT OF PAST STUDIES  
Since the Fitzhugh Commission in 1970, there have been numerous 
solutions proposed to improve the product development effort. As a result, “our 
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program success rate has not greatly improved, lead time remains excessive, the 
drive for new untried technology still remains and delays new systems…cost 
overruns are still with us…and we ignore history.” (Freeman, 1999, p.323)    
While there are isolated pockets of success stories, there continues to be a 
decline in the effectiveness of our test community to ensure a developing system 
makes it to the user on its first attempt through IOT&E.  DOT&E Thomas Christie 
makes reference to the rush that PMs put on their test team to get the product 
out the door,  
We’ve rushed into operational testing when the results of DT&E 
have clearly shown us that we were not ready and that our chances 
of success were minimal.  In essence, we have been rushing to 
failure. (Christie, 2002, speech)  
The numbers support his claim.  A report published by the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) evaluated eight programs and their combined cost for 
development.  In FY98, it was determined that it required $46.9 billion to 
complete the programs.  In FY03, this estimate was adjusted to $71.6 billion, a 
cost growth of 53% in five years.  (Levin, 2003)  Financial resources within the 
defense budget cannot continue to support program cost growth of this 
magnitude.   
 
I. SUMMARY 
If the focus remains on improving the performance of T&E since the 
1970s, DoD’s success rate is heading in the wrong direction.  This research 
highlights some of the primary factors for this current situation.  Aside from a 
continual change in operating procedures and guidelines, the T&E community 
has seen a dwindling budget, reduced support to maintain the range 
infrastructure, and reduced test expertise.  All this occurs as the weapon systems 
and the technology become more complex, and the scenarios required for testing 
increase in complexity.  Can major acquisition systems overcome these current 
challenges?  To do so requires an understanding of the current issues that 
plague the community, an understanding of how the commercial world succeeds 
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in their testing approach, and most importantly, an understanding of what can be 
learned from past programs, both the successes and failures.   
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II. EVALUATING THE CURRENT CLIMATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Various factors affect the ability for the tester to successfully perform his 
mission.  The ability for the T&E community to recognize those challenges early 
in the planning process increases the probability of executing an effective test 
program.  Recognizing common negative trends in T&E and understanding the 
results of past test improvement studies provides a solid foundation to build a 
program strategy.  It is essential to understand the status of the country’s range 
infrastructure in the support of T&E, as this will further provide a test planner 
awareness of potentially high-risk areas.  Finally, it is important that a tester have 
knowledge about the historical relationship between the program office and the 
test community, as this will offer a glimpse into the impending difficulties in 
establishing an acceptable multi-organizational test program. 
 
B. COMMON TRENDS 
While each Service has unique shortfalls associated with testing weapon 
systems, there are commonalities.  DOT&E reported in their FY02 annual report 
that common areas, which resulted in T&E performance problems, include:  
• Range encroachment; 
• Failure to identify immature technology; 
• Feedback loop breakdowns; 
• Insufficient or inadequate developmental testing; 
• Inadequate reliability testing; 
• Poor software tracking and evaluation procedures; 
• Insufficient prototypes and other test resources; 
• Stability of engineering workforce; 
• Inadequate evaluation of training; 
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• Hardware/software integration; 
• Slow tempo of testing operations; and 
• Insufficient interoperability of weapon systems. 
 (DOT&E, 2003, p.vi-ix) 
Aside from problems such as range encroachment and the stability of the 
engineering workforce, the remainder can be controlled at the program level and 
mitigated with a well thought-out T&E strategy.   
 
C. T&E INFRASTRUCTURE 
Range resources are essential for government programs to effectively test 
developing systems.  These resources include facilities, airspace, land, targets, 
people, instrumentation, and data collection.   Since the fall of the Soviet Union, 
funding shortfalls, divestiture, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), and a 
lapse in facilities maintenance have resulted in a decaying infrastructure unable 
to adequately support today’s T&E demands.  This shortfall has been identified 
by DOT&E as a major reason for inadequate testing of today’s military systems.   
The Honorable Mr. Christie stated in a speech to the National Defense Industrial 
Association (NDIA), 
I am concerned that our T&E infrastructure is not in the best of 
shape needed to meet the challenges of the future.  Failures of the 
acquisition process in the past, with all the program slips, have 
tended to ease the burden faced by the test ranges.  Lord knows 
what would happen if all the programs that claimed to be ready for 
testing in 2004 actually showed up for testing.  If the latest 
acquisition initiatives deliver what they hope for, then a greater 
fraction of programs should be ready for testing on or near their 
schedules.  In this respect, I fear the T&E community might not be 




1. Range Resource 
The Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) was established in 
1974.  Figure 2 provides a snapshot of the ranges that are part of MRTFB’s 
coverage.   
 
Figure 2.   MRTFB Coverage 
(Wascavage, 2004) 
 
The MRTFB’s governing policy states, “The MRTFB is a national asset 
that shall be sized, operated, and maintained primarily for DoD T&E support 
missions…”(DoDD 3200.11, 2003, p.2). Although this policy has not changed, 
MRTFB has seen its ability to support the policy become increasingly difficult.  
DOT&E points out that the primary reason for MRTFB’s shortfalls are due to a 
lack of investment.  
Investment funding for the T&E infrastructure provided over the 
past 10 to 15 years has not kept pace with the identified T&E 
needs, severely restricting our ability to adequately evaluate new 
technologies such as stealth, command and control systems, 
hypersonic weapons, and missile defense systems.  Funding for 
targets and threat simulator has also been sharply reduced.  
(DOT&E, 2002, p.II-4)  
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As a result of inadequate funding levels, the T&E recapitalization rate for 
the entire T&E infrastructure is 400 years.  When evaluating the technical 
infrastructure the rate is 70 years.  These rates are more than seven times that of 
the private sector.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld set a goal to reduce the latter 
number to 35 years.  (DOT&E, 2002, p.II-3)  Failure to meet this goal will 
degrade the range support necessary to effectively test emerging weapon 
systems.  The demands for higher levels of instrumentation and increased fidelity 
in target support are some examples of the shortfalls that affect programs 
because of the long recapitalization timeframe.  
Reliability of the systems supported by the ranges is important to 
developing programs.  As funds are reduced and systems begin to age, the cost 
to maintain and repair negatively affects the ability of the tester to complete the 
mission.  Two examples of the impact to a program due to test infrastructure 
shortfalls include: 
• A failure in a motor for a wind tunnel at the Arnold Engineering 
Development Center, TN resulted in a reduced capability for over 
seven months.  
• Intermittent failures in radio frequency (RF) emitters at NAWS 
China Lake, CA have affected the ability of the ARM Weapons 
Office to conduct flight-testing in the development of software 
upgrades to the HARM weapon system.  
These support shortfalls lead to test delays resulting in Fleet delivery delays or, if 
severe enough, the cancellation of the effort.   
Range encroachment has also threatened the MRTFB.  As US population 
and urban development continue to grow, DoD ranges continue to feel the 
effects.  Ranges that once were isolated are now finding housing developments 
near range boundaries.  Airspace for the military, whether for testing or training, 
is continuing to decline because of pressure from commercial industry.  Over the 
course of the last 10 years the China Lake airspace has seen increased 
restrictions as a result of both urbanization and commercial air traffic.  One 
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example is the increased difficulty to conduct low altitude testing within the Sierra 
Mountain range.  Noise complaints from the growing local population have 
resulted in flight restrictions keeping aircraft restricted either from designated 
areas or at altitudes that are not operationally representative.  The unfortunate 
circumstance with this current trend is that emerging weapon systems are 
requiring more airspace to effectively test.  This diametrically opposed flow 
results in programs not having the range space to fully test the system.   A 
developing weapon system, sponsored by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) 
as a Future Naval Capability (FNC), which incorporates the use of ram jet 
technology, will be conducting live-fire testing in the coming years.  The current 
concern is that the distance this weapon system can travel cannot be supported 
by any land range were data collection is best.  The test team assigned to the 
program is currently addressing this issue for possible alternatives.  The Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) is also addressing range limitations.  
Addressing a shortfall identified by DOT&E, the MDA is minimizing 
flight test restrictions by adding more intercept regions and launch 
locations to add greater realism to its tests.  MDA is expanding the 
test range infrastructure to add five intercept regions and target and 
interceptor launches out of new locations. (Government Accounting 
Office-04-254, 2004, p.3) 
Congestion in the frequency spectrum due to the commercial sector’s 
desire for increased frequency usage is also becoming a concern for the test 
community as it adversely affects military testing.  DOT&E has documented that 
ranges already delay tests because they do not have enough frequency 
spectrum to run multiple tests simultaneously.  These conflicts are common at 
the China Lake range facility and typically dictate which programs receive range 
periods.  Tight scheduling of instrumentation frequencies can create problems for 
programs.  When granted a frequency transmit time, it typically covers the 
prescribed range period.  It does not normally cover the time spent on deck, 
which for some programs is a critical phase to determine if the aircraft should 
launch.  If there is a restriction to transmit during ground operations, programs 
must either launch with an unknown system status or delay launch, thereby 
reducing the overall test time available for the range period. 
   
2. People 
Shortage of personnel has dramatically affected the T&E mission.  Loss of 
government, military, and contractor personnel from the ranks of the T&E 
workforce has created holes in the support structure, reducing corporate 
knowledge, leadership, and dedicated blue-collar labor.  A function of funding, 
the workforce levels have dropped drastically over the last 10 plus years, shown 
in Figure 3, while the workload has increased.   
 
Figure 3.   MRTFB Workforce Levels  
(DOT&E, 2004, p.341) 
The impact of government and military manpower shortages require that 
more contracting personnel be assigned to the program, increasing overall cost.  
This was the case in the F-22 program where a reduction in government 
workforce attributed to a plus-up in the Lockheed Martin contract.   
16 
17 
Manpower shortages dramatically affect the ability of the military test 
community to actively participate in the development of a weapon system. 
There is urgent need to bring military personnel back into the 
infrastructure so that systems undergoing developmental test can 
have the benefit of direct soldier input.  There is increased 
emphasis on providing earlier feedback to the development 
process; however, user participation is diminished.  Military users 
and operators must be restored to developmental testing in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of test programs. (DOT&E, 2003, p.318)  
These shortages in personnel, specifically military, are prevalent at the 
Navy’s DT and OT squadrons. Presently at the VX-31 Developmental Squadron, 
officer manning is at 85%.  (VX-31 Report, 2004, p.14) Within these commands, 
military testers find themselves handling multiple programs.  This high workload 
results in a reduced performance level, thereby raising the probability that 
operationally related problems will be overlooked, increasing program risk. 
 
3. Targets 
“The current inventory of targets does not adequately replicate emerging 
threats.  Adequate operational testing of new weapon systems requires targets 
possessing significantly greater threat fidelity.” (DOT&E, 2003, p.328)  DOT&E 
further went on to highlight the shortfalls in targets in their FY03 report.  “Testing 
has been delayed or not completed due to the absence or unreliability of 
available aerial targets.” (DOT&E, 2004, p.343)  In that report, specific types of 
targets were identified as being unsuitable for future use.  The first was the 
fidelity of DoD’s aerial targets.  Currently the QF-4 target aircraft, which is 
supported by VX-30 at NAS Point Mugu and is the primary target aircraft for Air-
to-Air (A/A) testing, will soon be divested.  This unique capability does not have a 
replacement.  The other issue with the QF-4 is the type of target it represents.  A 
Vietnam era aircraft, it does not adequately represent the aerial threats that our 
Warfighters face today or in the future. Another key target asset that has not 
been replaced is the Self Defense Test Ship (SDTS).  This ship is integral in the 
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development of systems that include Ship Self Defense Mark 2, Rolling Airframe 
Missile, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, DD(X), and CVN 21. 
Operationally representative targets are essential to verify system 
performance during test.  Shortages or lack of availability will limit the knowledge 
gained by the test team for test events.  To ensure targets are representative, the 
test community must adhere to the accreditation process identified by DOT&E.  
Since the cancellation of DoD 5000.2-R, which stated, “representative threats 
must be validated by DIA or the DoD Component Intelligence Agency, and 
approved by DOT&E.” (DoD 5000.2-R, 2002, p.58) Programs must maintain 
early communication with DOT&E to establish the acceptable Verification, 
Validation and Accreditation (VV&A) process to avoid surprises late in testing. 
 
4. Instrumentation and Data Collection 
The ongoing military transformation requires the T&E community to 
be prepared to test more sophisticated systems employing more 
advanced technology.  Without the resources and funding required 
to sustain, maintain, and modernize T&E, we face the inescapable 
conclusion that T&E will reach a point in the foreseeable future 
where the quality of testing and the information provided will 
deteriorate below reasonable and acceptable limits. (Gehrig et al., 
2002, p.58) 
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) fly-off may have already highlighted the 
level of degradation and availability of instrumentation and data collection service 
presently available.  During that time, the two competitors approached the use of 
the range and its ability to provide instrumentation data in two very different 
fashions.  One contractor followed the standard approach by relying on the 
already established data collection bays within range control.  This approach led 
to scheduling delays or lost test events due to range support availability conflicts.  
The other contractor developed a unique data collection van.  This remote and 
mobile facility allowed this contractor to more effectively achieve and complete 
test events by reducing the reliance on the range bays and personnel needed to 
operate them.  It afforded this contractor a broader range of test times that would 
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have otherwise not been available due to other test program conflicts or range 
personnel work schedules. (CAPT Burris, 2004, interview) 
 
5. DoD Test and Resource Management Center (DTRMC) 
The DTRMC is a recently established organization, which reports directly 
to the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).  
The DTRMC stems from a recommendation made by the Defense Science Board 
(DSB) task force in 1999.  “OSD and the Services should work together to 
develop a plan whereby T&E resource management is strengthened and brought 
under coherent control.” (Defense Science Board, 1999, p.23)  Their function is 
to develop and maintain a strategic plan for T&E and to certify the adequacy of 
T&E resources.  DOT&E believes that the establishment of such an organization 
is essential to support T&E as new and innovative programs begin to enter the 
acquisition pipeline.  They add that the DTRMC will focus scarce T&E investment 
resources toward the most critical needs and address future needs. (DOT&E, 
2004, p. 337)   
 
D. DOD TEST PHILOSOPHY  
1. Test Communities 
Within the DoD acquisition community, there are multiple test agencies 
and commands each with different responsibilities.  While numerous, they are in 
place to support the two primary test communities: DT and OT.  
Agencies/commands focused on DT product development determine whether a 
system meets the technical specifications as defined in the contract and system 
specification. These specifications are the basis of the Critical Test Parameters 
defined in the TEMP. 
The responsibilities for the DT community as stated in DODI 5000.2 dated 
May 12, 2003 are:   
• Identify the technical capabilities and limitations of the alternative 
concepts and design options under consideration; 
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• Identify and describe design technical risks; 
• Stress the system under test to at least the limits of the Operational 
Mode Summary/Mission Profile, and, for some systems, beyond the 
normal operating limits to ensure the robustness of the design; 
• Assess technical progress and maturity against critical technical 
parameters, to include interoperability, documented in the TEMP; 
• Assess the safety of the system/item to ensure safety during OT 
and other troop-supported testing and to support success in 
meeting design safety criteria; 
• Provide data and analytic support to the decision process to certify 
the system ready for IOT&E; 
• Conduct information assurance testing on any system that collects, 
stores, transmits, or processes unclassified or classified 
information. 
• In the case of IT systems support the DoD Information Technology 
Security Certification and Accreditation Process and Joint 
Interoperability Certification process; 
• In the case of financial management, enterprise resource planning, 
and mixed financial management systems, the developer shall 
conduct an independent assessment of compliance factors 
established by the Office of the USD; and 
• Prior to full-rate production, demonstrate the maturity of the 
production process through Production Qualification Testing of 
LRIP assets. 
         (DoDI 5000.2, 2003, pp.26-27) 
 
On the other side of the test spectrum is the OT community.  This 
community evaluates the effectiveness and suitability of a system in a realistic 
operational environment.  The objectives of the OT&E phase as defined in the 
DoDI 5000.2 are: 
• OT&E shall determine the operational effectiveness and suitability 
of a system under realistic operational conditions, including combat; 
determine if thresholds in the approved Capabilities Production 
Document (CPD) and critical operational issues have been 
satisfied; and assess impacts to combat operations; 
• Typical users shall operate and maintain the system or item under 
conditions simulating combat stress and peacetime conditions; 
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• The independent Operational Test Agency (OTA) shall use 
production or production representative articles for the dedicated 
phase of IOT&E that supports the full-rate production decision (or 
for Acquisition Category (ACAT) IA or other acquisition programs, 
the full-deployment decision); 
• Hardware and software alterations that materially change system 
performance, including system upgrades and changes to correct 
deficiencies, shall undergo OT&E; 
• OTAs shall conduct an independent, dedicated phase of IOT&E 
before full-rate production to evaluate operational effectiveness and 
suitability, as required by reference; and 
• All weapon, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), and 
information programs that are dependent on external information 
sources, or that provide information to other DoD systems, shall be 
tested and evaluated for information assurance.  
         (DoDI 5000.2, 2003, pp.27-28) 
 
The Key Performance Parameter (KPP) as defined in the Capabilities 
Description Document (CDD), formerly known as the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD), is the metric that the OT community uses.  All systems under 
test must meet the KPPs in order to establish a foundation for operational test 
success.    
Historically the two testing phases were conducted in very structured and 
separate stages of a test program.  DT executed their functions and then when 
complete, transferred the program to the OT community.  With acquisition reform, 
there have been attempts to integrate the two phases of test.  This integration 
would reduce the test repetition between organizations, identify deficiencies 
earlier in development, and clearly identify OT recourses, thereby reducing the 
overall product development timeline.  This approach supports one of the 
recommendations by the DSB. 
Each of the Service DT & OT organizations should be consolidated; 
to include integrated planning use of models, simulation, and data 
reduction.  Planning should be totally integrated, and the OSD T&E 
organizations   consolidated.   There  should  be  integrated  use  of  
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models, simulation, and data reduction.  Except for limited 
dedicated OT&E, contractor and government testing should also be 
integrated. (DSB, 1999, p.23) 
 
2. Test Approach 
PMs must face many challenges throughout their tenure.  They come to 
the position with a variety of programs at various stages of development, and 
they must ensure that they can preserve each one.  They are faced with this 
formidable challenge due to the foundation that a majority of DoD programs are 
built upon.  They see exaggerated optimism in scheduling and unrealistic 
estimates in budget planning.   
Both industry and DoD program managers have suffered from a 
contagious trend of unmerited optimism in defining and supporting 
both cost and schedule program risks, especially across the most 
complex programs such as V-22, F-22, and Comanche.  The initial 
program baselines were built around making the programs fit inside 
a constricting cost and schedule box vs. designing program plans 
within flexible boxes to accommodate the many unknowns 
associated with complex integration initiatives. (Birmingham and 
Rogers, 2004, p.55) 
As a result of this unstable foundation, PMs normally delay system testing 
until late in the development cycle.  This affords the program time to let 
technology catch up to the requirements and prevents unwanted attention from 
decision-makers who may be interested in diverting funds.  This approach, while 
short sighted and extremely risky, is the path that the current acquisition process 
forces a PM to follow.  The GAO noted this approach during a study of a major 
aircraft development program.   
Our work has shown that numerous weapon system programs 
suffer from persistent problems associated with late or incomplete 
testing.  This practice pushes the burden of discovery late in 
development when problems become very costly to resolve.  We 
also found that testing operated under a penalty environment that 
creates perverse incentives.  For example, if tests were not passed, 
the program might look less attractive and be vulnerable to funding 
cuts.  Managers thus had incentives to postpone difficult tests and 
limit open communication about test results.  These represent 
widespread and systemic problems within the Department that 
must be addressed. (GAO-01-369R, 2001, p.2)  
Another key element that drives the PM to this avoidance test strategy is 
DoD’s failure to properly recognize immature technology when an acquisition 
program begins.  There is confidence that given the right amount of time the 
technology will be there when needed in a program’s development cycle.  This 
eventually results in program cost overruns and schedule delays.  GAO reported, 
The competition for funding at the time of launch encourages 
aspiring DoD programs to include performance features and design 
characteristics that rely on immature technologies.  Untempered by 
knowledge to the contrary, the risks associated with these 
technologies are deemed acceptable.  Because production can be 
15 years from the launch decision, it is difficult for production 
realities and concerns to exert as much influence on a DoD product 
development as they do on commercial products.  Instead, design 
features and performance are more dominant.  More unknowns are 
accepted on a DoD program, and their attendant risks are often 
understated.  This combination, which can be devastating to a 
commercial business case, can help a weapon system program get 
launched and survive.  (GAO-98-123, 1998, p.15) 
 
Figure 4.   Cost and Schedule Experiences on Product Development  
(GAO-99-162, 1999, p.27) 
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Figure 4 reflects the impact that immature technology at program inception 
can have on a program cost and schedule.  Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 
definitions are provided in appendix A. TRL numbers represent product maturity 
levels for key technologies.  While there is no requirement to accept a desired 
number as a benchmark for inclusion in a program, GAO studies have identified 
that DoD typically accepts readiness levels below that of commercial firms, as 
shown in Figure 5, resulting in higher cost and schedule overruns.  Ultimately 




Figure 5.   Readiness Levels of Technology at Time of Program Inclusion 




Another DoD development program that suffered from immature 
technology during the development phase was the A-12 Avenger.  The immature 
technology could not support the proposed design or requirements.  The amount 
of composites that were necessary to support the overall structure for a carrier 
environment while maintaining the stealth capability resulted in weights that 
exceeded the specification by almost 30%.  The composite technology was so 
immature that General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas would have had to 
develop it during full-scale development, because they had limited experience in 
building large structures using composites.  (Pike, n.d., ¶ 7)  
Faced with schedule slippages due to technology delays and the 
increased budget that accompanies these slips, PMs are prone to hold off testing 
until late in the development cycle.   During this non-test time, PMs use Power 
Point presentations and engineering studies to show progress and begin 
developing a case that when testing does begin, the test phase should be 
expedient with no major systems failures.  Often this is not the result.   This 
approach to testing creates late cycle development problems that could have 
been identified and corrected at lower cost earlier in a program’s schedule had 
the proper subsystem testing been performed.  Theater High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) Program used this conservative approach.  “Instead of break it 
big early philosophy, program officials waited until flight testing to stress 
components and subsystems.  As a result, key subsystems were not sufficiently 
matured for integration and flight testing.” (GAO-00-199, 2000, p. 34) 
Failure early will create a perception of program trouble.  This can allow 
other programs and adversaries to lobby for the cancellation or reduction of 
funds for the respective program.  Since program funding is typically unstable 
and consistently up for reviews, PMs attempt to postpone any chance for 
perceived failure for as long as possible by delaying or canceling test events.  
Missile Defense Program follows this philosophy.  GAO noted that, “MDA is 
generally not addressing DOT&E’s proposal for ground testing…MDA deferred 
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testing at the facility to fund other priorities.” (GAO-04-254, 2004, p. 3)  Senator 
Jack Reed (D-RI) further supported GAO,  
This report confirms that rather than thoroughly testing the missile 
defense system, the Administration is blindly spending billions of 
dollars every year with the exclusive goal of deploying system by 
September even if that system is ineffective and it capabilities 
untested. (Reed, April 23, 2004)  
DoD testing methodology does not offer a true understanding of product 
maturity. The methodology supports a pass/fail system. If the test event equates 
to a pass, then the program survives.  Conversely, if there is failure, interest 
within DoD and potentially Congress increases.  DOT&E recommended that the 
test community shift away from this black and white metric and evaluate based 
on knowledge gained.  The Honorable Mr. Christie reinforced this concept by 
stating, 
Testing is for learning! That may sound somewhat trite, but how 
often have we strayed from that dictum and reflected the proverbial 
Pass/Fail mentality we’re so often accused of.  (Christie, 2002, 
speech) 
Because of the pass/fail philosophy, complete integrated system tests are 
normally held off until late in the program’s developmental stages or the 
complexity of test scenarios are limited to ensure a successful test.  To Cite the 
GAO report on the ballistic missile defense, “no component of the system to be 
fielded by September 2004 has been flight tested in it deployable configuration.”  
(GAO-04-254, 2004, p.4) 
The overall outcome of such strategies leads to the identification of major 
system problems late in the development cycle.   This delays knowledge about 
the program’s product maturity.  A GAO report that assesses major DoD 
programs states, 
The difference between highly successful product developments—
those that deliver superior products within cost and schedule 
projections—and problematic product developments is how this 
knowledge is built and how early in the development cycle each 
knowledge point is attained.  (GAO-03-476, 2003, p.4)  
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of the financial resources that go to support the range infrastructure.   
Figure 6.   MRTFB Funding Responsibility 
&E, 2004, p.340) 
 
he transfer of financial responsibility contributes to the reduction in the 
DT eff
PMs must also face another burden.  DoD has reduced institutional 
funding to support the test ranges, as shown in Figure 6, and placed the 




ort.  The Honorable Mr. Michael Wynne during testimony to the US Senate 
Committee on Armed Services identified this as a concern.  “We are concerned 
with the continuing problem surrounding overhead costs and their impact to 
program managers when they use the test ranges and facilities.” (Wynne, 2002, 






3. Test Culture  
As testers report poor test results to the PM, there is a natural tendency 
for the PM to become defensive.  The PM views these failures as an impact to 
his or her schedule and budget.  As a result, the inherent nature of the PM-Tester 
relationship, even before testing begins, is adversarial.  “Too often testing is seen 
as the spoilsport, the bearer of bad news, or at least cold reality – and facts and 
figures that aren’t as glowing as the program manager would have wished.” 
(Johnson, 2001, p.69)  Other studies site this negative relationship. 
Research has found that a negative test culture exists in many 
PMOs, and this culture may have been the basis of testing 
problems.  Several PMOs, and sometimes contractors, have 
displayed a negative attitude toward testing, testers, and analysts.  
The representative causes noted for this problem included the 
acquisition process itself, lack of PMO understanding of test and 
analysis capabilities and constraints, and the assumption that 
testers and analysts always require more or excessive testing.  
However, it was also found that some testers and analysts have 
earned poor reputations among program offices by conducting tests 
that appeared to add no value to the process or testing for weapon 
capabilities that were beyond the design requirements.  (Hoivik, 
2000, p. 35) 
In order to promote positive test culture, there needs to be an honest and 
continuous flow of communication between the test agencies and the PM. 
 
4. DoD Summary 
The DoD test structure delineates between the DT and OT communities.  
Within each division, there are multiple test agencies and commands. The 
current direction by the acquisition community is to integrate these communities 
to promote an overall reduction in product development time.  This should then 
translate in cost and schedule savings with reduced potential for program failure 
during the independent operational assessment.  Even if DoD is successful in 
integrating the two communities during the test effort, they still face challenges to 
overcome in the basic test philosophy.  DoD continues to accept low technology 
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readiness for key technologies at program inception.  They further delay testing 
until late in product development, thereby reducing system development 
knowledge and increasing overall risk.  This approach is contrary to the desires 
of the test community, specifically the DT community, and as a result fosters a 
negative test culture.  
 
E. COMMERCIAL TEST PHILOSOPHY  
The commercial industry has a much different approach with respect to 
product testing.  They view testing as a learning opportunity and a means to 
evaluate progress in the transformation of a vision into a product.  They test 
vigorously early in development to avoid late-cycle development problems. There 
are three distinct learning phases in commercial testing: (1) components work 
individually; (2) components work together as a system in a controlled setting; 
and (3) components work together as a system in realistic settings. (GAO-00-
199, 2000, p.5) At the basic level, these cycles are not much different from the 
cycles in DoD testing.   What is different is the approach.  Distinct differences 
from DoD are the level of technical maturity required at program initiation and the 
test approach.  Commercial firms are adverse to include technology that is not 
mature.  Immature technology creates unnecessary risk and can result in 
schedule delays or cost overruns.  Boeing followed this approach during the 
development of the 767. 
Boeing’s conservative approach was illustrated in the 1970s and 
1980s when it decided not to include in its 767 more advanced 
systems such as fly-by-wire, fly-by-light, flat panel video displays, 
and advanced propulsion systems.  Even though the technology 
existed, Boeing did not believe it was mature enough for the 767.  
(Battershell, 1995, p.215) 
Testing is also approached differently.  When tests are structured and 
executed, it is to gain knowledge and to help improve the product.  Firms 
consider a test a failure if there is no increase in product maturity knowledge.  
Program managers for the 777-200 aircraft, a highly successful development and  
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test effort, considered problems resulting from test as “gems to be mined” (GAO-
00-199, 2000, p.8) and believed earlier identification resulted in less expensive 
fixes.  
Commercial firms have a stake in delivering products on time and within 
defined performance standards.  Their motivation is profit.  If product’s 
performance, schedule, or cost metrics are below expectations, the impact 
results in a reduced market share, disgruntled customers, and lower profits for 
the product.  This reality provides motivation to industry leaders such as Boeing, 
Intel and Dupont.  Each company has experienced the ill effects of a poor T&E 
culture that resulted in the discovery of product problems late in the development 
cycle.  In some cases, discovery occurred after product delivery. 
 
1. Boeing’s Lesson Learned 
Boeing’s educational awakening to the value of testing early and 
aggressively was a result of problems experienced in the development of their 
747-400 models.  Significant problems identified late in the aircraft’s development 
cycle, due to design and requirements changes, resulted in ineffective testing, 
late deliveries, and eventual service problems.   
Typically, engineers were still designing when manufacturing 
began, and they kept making changes as problems subsequently 
came to light on the factory floor, on the flight line, and even in the 
customer’s hands after the plane was delivered.  For example, 
when Boeing delivered the 747-400 to United in 1990, it had to 
assign 300 engineers to get rid of bugs that it hadn’t spotted earlier.  
United was not happy with Boeing’s late delivery of the 747, nor 
with the additional costs the airlines sustained in rescheduling 
flights and compensating unhappy customers as a result of 
maintenance delays.  Boeing was deeply embarrassed by delivery 
delays and initial service problems for its 747.  (Battershell, 1995, 
p.217) 
As a result, a new development and test approach drove management 
during the development of the 777-200 aircraft.  This approach fostered an 
increase in the scope of testing thereby identifying problems early in the cycle.  
The result was a product delivered on time within performance requirements and 
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with a 60% reduction in changes, errors, and rework as compared to their 
previous aircraft programs. (GAO-00-199, 2000, p.23) 
 
2. Intel’s Lesson Learned 
Intel’s experience stemmed from not properly analyzing and learning from 
test data.  With the development of a microprocessor, Intel conducted a test that 
indicated a problem with higher-level mathematical functions.  Based on the test 
data, Intel concluded that the impact would be minimal to the consumer as the 
occurrence of the failure would be rare.  This analysis led the company to release 
the microprocessor with a known flaw.  Unfortunately, a miscalculation with 
respect to the rarity of the failure resulted in the company having to replace more 
than a million microprocessors at a cost of $500 million.  (GAO-00-199, 2000, 
p.25)  Intel corrected their flawed T&E and analysis approach and today is 
successful with Pentium processor development.  Intel reported that the reason 
for the “bug” being allowed to hit the market was a result of testing concluding too 
early.  They determined that if the development team had exercised the system 
longer, the effects of the computer bug would have been identified before market 
release.  Similar to Boeing, Intel increased the amount of validation testing 
conducted to identify problems, and with the increase in effort, they increased the 
amount of personnel support.  The latter is typically difficult to do in a DoD 
program due to funding constraints and the availability of qualified personnel.   
Intel’s increased focus, with respect to T&E, for its microprocessors has resulted 
in an increased product release rate.  
 
3. Dupont’s Lesson Learned  
Dupont’s realization about its poor T&E approach was a result of an 
internal analysis regarding its product development effort.  It identified that it was 
taking twice as long to deliver a product to the customer as its competitor.  This 
resulted in a loss of millions of dollars in revenue.  It determined that the 
company’s philosophy on test failures was driving them to identify problems late 
in a product’s development life cycle.  This led to late corrective actions at high 
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costs, a process familiar to DoD.  As a result, the company changed their 
paradigm that test failures meant a bad product.  They now have adopted the 
approach that test failures are a means to learn more about the product’s 
development.  Their philosophy is “if a test does not lend any new information 
about the system’s maturity then it is considered a failure.” (GAO-00-199, 2000, 
p. 45) With resources and costs of testing rising, this approach ensures effective 
utilization of limited test resources.   
 
4. Management and Tester Relationship 
Companies further view the testers as equals in the product development 
effort.  Their input is valuable to the successful development of a product.   This 
positive relationship helps foster test team motivation, since they feel they are 
members of an organization trying to make the product succeed.  This 
relationship further provides a personal boost to each member as it helps instill 
the concept that his or her input is important to the development of a product.  As 
highlighted in a previous section, this working environment is not always present 
in DoD efforts.  PMs sometimes view testers as roadblocks, and testers 
sometimes create difficulties for the PMs by not properly testing or evaluating a 
system due to their ignorance system requirements.  
  
5. Commercial Summary 
The overall commercial philosophy on testing is quite different from the 
DoD approach.  Commercial firms have a knowledge-based testing approach. 
They effectively and efficiently attempt to use the testing resources available to 
provide knowledge about the program’s maturity during the development effort.   
They focus on testing systems hard early in development in hopes of identifying 
trouble areas.  Early identification of deficiencies will allow fixes at a reduced 
cost.  The commercial sector is able to take this approach because of the means 
by which they fund a program.  Unlike the complete financial support normally 
given by a commercial firm, the government approach requires that programs 
continuously defend their budget.  This results in PMs taking a less aggressive 
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test approach early, thereby delaying the identification of problems until late in 
the system’s development effort.  During this time of late discovery, resources 
are normally low, and more are required to correct the identified flaws.  While this 
is the current practice, DoD is driving PMs to be more aggressive in the 
knowledge-based testing environment.  Embedded in the DoD 5000.2, there is 
guidance that supports the philosophy discussed in the commercial industry. 
Knowledge-Based Acquisition.  PMs shall provide knowledge about 
key aspects of a system at key points in the acquisition process.  
PMs shall reduce technology risk, demonstrate technologies in a 
relevant environment, and identify technology alternatives, prior to 
program initiation.  They shall reduce integration risk and 
demonstrate product design prior to the design readiness review.  
They shall reduce manufacturing risk and demonstrate producibility 
prior to full-rate production.   (DODD 5000.2, 2003, p.5) 
 
 F. DOD STUDIES 
Two major studies, sponsored by DoD, were undertaken in the late 1990s 
and in the early part of the new century.  The first, developed by the DSB Task 
Force on Test and Evaluation was chartered by the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology) (USD (A&T)) in 1998.  The DSB was tasked to 
review all activities relating to T&E within DoD.  This monumental task 
culminated in a final report on T&E in 1999.  The focus of the report was to 
identify the current state of T&E and offer recommendations to overcome any 
identified shortfalls.  The concern that drove this report was the expectation that 
procurement of major programs would be on a steady increase.  This trend would 
put a strain on the current range infrastructure and the overall RDT&E budget, 
necessitating a push to become more efficient in the business of T&E.  The 
second report, directed by the Deputy Director, DT&E USD (AT&L), focused on 
industry best practices and their applicability to DoD DT&E.   
 
1. Defense Science Board Study 
The DSB’s directives that guided the study were: 
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• Examine new and innovative ways that the T&E community can 
better support its users; 
• Find new ways to integrate operational testing into the overall 
system development process; 
• Consider the special problems associated with T&E of the “systems 
of system” which increasingly comprise critical parts of our military 
capability; 
• Identify and quantify the current and future needs of the 
Department’s T&E capabilities and resources; and 
• Recommend specific and quantified changes.  
(DSB, 1999, p. 10)  
Their research and analysis offered observations and recommendations to 
improve the T&E process.  The findings include: 
• The focus of T&E should be on how to best support the acquisition 
process; 
• T&E planning with operational test personnel should start early in 
the acquisition cycle; 
• Distrust remains between the Program Management and test 
communities; 
• Contractor Testing, Developmental Testing, and Operational 
Testing have some overlapping functions; 
• Independence of evaluation of test data is the essential element, 
not the taking of the data itself; and 
• Response to perceived test “failures” is often inappropriate and 
counter productive.   
(DSB, 1999, pp. 1,2) 
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 Recommendation Review 
The focus of T&E should be on how to best support the acquisition 
process.  The test community must establish a test approach that supports 
learning and confirming the systems performance at various stages of product 
development.  As indicated in a previous section, DoD has encouraged this 
approach in the recent DoD 5000.2 with Knowledge Based Acquisition. 
T&E planning with operational test personnel should start early in the 
acquisition cycle.  First, by interfacing with the operational testers and users 
earlier in the test process, the test team can confirm that they understand the 
requirements.  This will enable them to design test scenarios that evaluate the 
system based on expected Fleet/Field usage.  This has been a recommended 
approach by DOT&E.  While operational scenario testing is expected from the 
OT community, DOT&E proposes that this philosophy flow into the DT paradigm.  
“We must reinforce the principle that systems that go to war must be tested the 
way they will be employed.” (DOT&E, 2003, p. iii)  Second, testers, specifically 
the OT community, must attempt to participate early despite resource 
constraints.  They must also not consider that early involvement will result in 
losing their independence in test.  This early involvement was a major element 
for the success experienced with the F/A-18E/F test program.   
Active participation of VX-9 (Navy OT squadron) in the Integrated 
Test Team ensured that operational insights were always readily 
available to the developing organizations. The benefits of this close 
coupling were demonstrated as the program discovered and then 
overcame a flight problem referred to as wing drop.  As 
modifications were installed to counter this phenomenon, the active 
participation of operational pilots provided rapid feedback as to 
whether the phenomenon interfered with mission conduct.  This 
synergy between operational insight and developmental effort 
allowed alternative designs to be quickly evaluated.  A production 
fix was determined, and a potentially major deficiency was rapidly 
corrected.  (Institute for Defense Analysis, 1999, p.11) 
Distrust remains between the Program Management and test 
communities.  This has been a recurring discovery from a variety of sources 
highlighted in this research. Similar to the commercial sector philosophy, PMs 
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should view the test community, both DT and OT, as members of the 
development team who are chartered to make the product better, and not as 
enemies attempting to cancel a program.  Communication, a clear understanding 
of program requirements, and early resource planning are means that the test 
community can use to aid in maintaining a positive relationship with the PM. 
Contractor Testing, Developmental Testing, and Operational Testing have 
some overlapping functions.  DoD executes many overlapping tests throughout 
the product development cycle.  The primary difference between similar tests is 
the controlling agency that is conducting the test.  With limited resources and 
increased complexity of systems, a more integrated testing approach early in the 
product development cycle is necessary.  An integrated approach will help 
facilitate earlier operational involvement.  This integration must comply with 
statutory regulations. Under Title 10 U.S.C. 2399, “no person employed by the 
contractor of the system being tested may be involved in the conduct of the 
operational test and evaluations.”  It further states, “A contractor that has 
participated in the development, production, or testing of a system for a Military 
Department or Defense Agency may not be involved in the establishment of 
criteria for data collection, performance assessment, or evaluation activities for 
the operational test and evaluation. “ (Stoddart, 2001, p.5)  Recognizing the 
statutory limitations, a test team can develop a strategy that integrates the efforts 
of the contractor and development team and then the development and 
operational test teams. While restrictive, these regulations do not prohibit the 
interaction of the contractor and the operational community, rather they limit.   
Independence of evaluation of test data is the essential element, not the 
taking of the data itself.  Data should be available for all agencies to view and 
analyze.  This can reduce test repetition, especially during the developmental 
portion of test.  An understanding on data requirements for the various test 
agencies supports this recommendation. The environment where the data is 
collected must be meticulously recorded to ensure applicability for other test 
agencies.  While data collected during DT cannot replace OT data, it can help 
support the OT effort if proper records are kept on its collection. 
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Response to perceived test “failures” is often inappropriate and counter 
productive.  Similar to the commercial test philosophy, test failures should be 
viewed as learning opportunities and not program failures especially early in the 
development testing phase.  A program office that understands this attribute will 
also have a better working relationship with its respective developmental test 
team.  “Backing away from the pass/fail mentality and truly testing for learning,” 
(Christie, 2004, speech) are philosophies supported by DOT&E.  
  
2. Commercial T&E Best Practices  
The DoD funded study conducted by Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC) examined high-powered companies with strengths in 
aviation, software, and technology and their approach to T&E.  The developers of 
the study grouped their findings into four areas: test philosophy; test investment; 
test execution; and test evaluation.  The list they produced in the document was 
extensive.  Within the body of this text, applicable points considered relevant to 
this research are presented. 
Test Philosophy 
• Recognize that testing is a way to identify and solve problems early in 
the process in order to control time, cost and schedule late in the 
process.  
• Increase T&E to assure product quality rather than reduce it to save 
T&E cost.  
Test Investment 
• Ensure early determination of the investment costs to acquire new 
capability for program support.  
Test Execution 
• Involve testers and evaluators very early: (1) ensure testers know test 
requirements; (2) ensure developers know requirements for test.  
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• Emphasis on concurrent and integrated T&E.  
• Use measures and metrics. 
• Train the in-house test workforce in test engineering disciplines.  
Test Evaluation 
• Correlate faults and solutions in a closed loop process to ensure 
problems are resolved.  
(Science Applications International Corporation, 2002, pp. 3-4) 
 
T&E Best Practices Review 
Test Philosophy 
• Recognize that testing is a way to identify and solve problems early in 
the process in order to control time, cost and schedule late in the 
process.  A recurring theme throughout the research was that the PMs 
as well as Program Executive Officers (PEOs) should view the test 
process as a means to gain knowledge about the product they are 
charged to develop.  The commercial industry, DOT&E, and the 
Defense Science Board have stated the importance of this T&E 
approach. Despite this support, PMs are reluctant to support a test 
strategy that increases a risk early in a program’s development 
schedule.  The benefit of identifying deficiencies early to afford time 
and the proper allocation of resources to effectively correct the shortfall 
does not outweigh the risk of spotlighting limitations of a program in the 
acquisition community.  “The detection of a problem on an individual 
program makes that program vulnerable to criticism and possible loss 
of funding support.” (GAO-98-123, 1998, p.16) 
• Increase T&E to assure product quality rather than reduce it to save 
T&E cost.  PMs should strongly resist the desire to reduce the scope of 
T&E to accommodate schedule slips or cost overruns. This scaled 
back approach eventually leads to the identification of deficiencies 
during OT phases.   Figure 7 conceptually illustrates a very real 
problem with reducing the test process.  What may save in either cost 
or schedule today could cost in the future. 
 
“...and we can save 900 lira by not taking soil tests.”  
Figure 7.   Shortchanging T&E 
 
Test Investment 
• Ensure early determination of the investment costs to acquire new 
capability for program support.  The resource requirements necessary 
to execute a test program require clear identification by the T&E 
planners and communication to the program office.  Failure to do so 
will result in a catch up mode to gain funding for the resources.  
Including the test community early in the program’s development and 
planning phases will help the PM understand the level of resource 
requirements.   Involving the OT community early in this process is 
essential.  Since funding for OT comes from the PM, it is essential to 
identify OT test needs early to ensure that there can be proper budget 
and resource planning.  Involving the communities before a Milestone 
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B decision will ensure that the resource requirements are understood 
and properly recorded in Part V of the TEMP. 
Test Execution 
• Involve testers and evaluators very early: (1) ensure testers know test 
requirements; (2) ensure developers know requirements for test.  
Previous studies as well as leaders in the T&E field, such as the former 
DOT&E, Dr. Philip Coyle, have echoed this observation 
Are you including the operational testers up front…They can 
help you early with requirements issues, with operational 
emphasis in the Request For Proposal (RFP), and with test 
and evaluation planning.  Confronting such matters later will 
only increase costs and delay schedules, placing your 
program at unnecessary risk. (Coyle, 2000, p.5) 
• Emphasize concurrent and integrated T&E.  DoD is embracing this 
concept under the evolutionary acquisition approach.  NAVAIR and 
COMOPTEVFOR are implementing such a strategy through a F/A-18 
software upgrade program. Integration of testing will aid product 
development through the sharing of the limited resources from funding, 
range assets and support, and weapons asset availability.   As noted in 
the earlier DSB discussion, integration T&E involving the use of the 
contractor will aid the government test communities.  A positive blend 
of contractor and developmental T&E provides an opportunity to 
conduct early robust subsystem testing.  This testing will enhance 
knowledge about the system components and provide an opportunity 
early in the development effort to correct deficiencies.  This form of 
testing does not capture the eyes of others within the acquisition 
community and provides a platform to test for knowledge before the 
higher profile testing during DT and OT.    
• Use measures and metrics. Establishing baselines or measures of test 
will allow the tester to effectively track the product development effort. 
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It will also afford the tester the opportunity to clearly communicate the 
testing progress to the PM.    
• Train the in-house test workforce in test engineering disciplines.  As 
resources are tight, it is very important as a PM to ensure that your 
T&E team is well trained and experienced.  The knowledge they have 
will help increase the probability for correct planning and execution.   In 
addition, “training provided to the program offices serves as a key 
agent in both creating a culture that is receptive to new practices and 
in providing the knowledge needed to implement new practices at the 
workplace.” (GAO-99-206, 1999, p.2)   
Test Evaluation 
• Correlate faults and solutions in a closed loop process to ensure 
problems are resolved.  
o As a program progresses in testing, there is increased risk of 
overlooking or not resolving system failures or deficiencies.  
Establishing a clear approach to reporting, tracking, correcting, 
and verifying the correction will aid the product development 
process. 
o Within the ARM Program Office, there is an established 
approach, as illustrated in Figure 8, to handle the evaluation 
portion of test and track the observed faults or deficiencies for 























































Figure 8.   ARM Failure Analysis Chain 
 
G. SUMMARY 
 There are common trends identified by DOT&E that affect the ability of the 
PM to effectively test a system.  These shortfalls are a product of DoD’s 
infrastructure and philosophical approach to testing.  The test infrastructure is 
slowly deteriorating.  It has reached the point where the creation of a DoD Test 
and Resource Management Center was required.  DTRMC, a recommendation 
by the DSB in 1999 and then by DOT&E in FY02, will be responsible to assess 
and allocate the necessary policies to rebuild the declining range infrastructure.  
Given a better set of tools, PMs will be able to more effectively and efficiently test  
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a developing system at a potential cost savings.  The reason is that with an 
improvement to the infrastructure, newer and more reliable range systems can 
be available.   
 While there is apparent progress in the range infrastructure shortfall, DoD 
philosophy towards testing still requires a transformational shift.   While studies 
and recent DoD Directives have supported this shift towards the commercial best 
practice known as knowledge-based testing, the transformation has been slow to 
occur.  There continues to remain a desire to minimize testing early in a 
program’s development cycle.  This process is exacerbated through the 
acceptance of high technology risks (low TRLs) at program inception.  The 
commercial industry has learned through experience that a program cannot be 
successful if early knowledge of system capability is not attained.  With the 
growing complexity of DoD weapon systems from an individual and interoperable 
perspective, DoD leadership must provide the necessary support to the PMs to 
support this knowledge-based approach.  By doing so, it will foster an improved 
test culture as it will effectively allow the DT community to properly test the 
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III. LEARNING FROM HISTORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Learning from the mistakes or good test approaches that other programs 
have used is good practice.  In order to support this approach, respective 
programs should generate and make readily available documentation that 
discusses lessons learned.  In the aviation community, specifically naval aviation, 
this is conducted through flight debriefs, squadron meetings, and professional 
magazines.  During this time, aviators provide mission alibis.  This offers others 
in attendance an opportunity to learn from the errors.  By openly conducting this 
lesson learned feedback loop, there is a decreased risk that others will repeat the 
mistake and thereby increase mission success and/or save lives.  In the 
acquisition community, there is very little opportunity to provide such feedback to 
the community.  Fear of retribution or lack of time restricts wide dissemination of 
lessons learned from programs.  Typically carried by word of mouth from 
experienced testers, this dissemination does not allow a large group to be 
educated.  Furthermore, test teams are quickly disbanded at the end of a 
program before the production of a quality lesson learned document. There is 
also typically no support in the budget to provide such a document.   The 
following section discusses some testing lessons learned from former programs. 
 
B. NAVAIR PERFORMANCE 
 A study was conducted by NAVAIR to evaluate trends and observations, 
shown in Figure 9, in the testing of systems sent to the OT community.  The 
analysis covered 64 programs that were in OPEVAL or Follow-On Test & 
Evaluation (FOT&E) from FY-97 through FY-00.  During this time, NAVAIR 
programs experienced a 3% failure rate in the area of operational effectiveness.  
While quite an impressive achievement, the associated operational suitability 
numbers were not as positive. In this area, 23% of the programs failed.  (AIR 
5.1E Brief, 2004) The results found that training, documentation, reliability, and 
logistic support were deficient.  




• INCOMPLETE, NO TRAINING PLAN, NO TRAINER
DOCUMENTATION
• INCOMPLETE, INACCURATE, COMPLEX, AND/OR INADEQUATE
RELIABILITY
• RESULTS MAGNITUDES LOWER THAN THRESHOLDS (HARDWARE AND 
SOFTWARE)
LOGISTIC SUPPORT 
• SUPPORT PLANS NOT AVAILABLE, COMPLETED OR FULLY IMPLEMENTED
• PARTS NOT AVAILABLE
• PARTS NOT IN NAVY SUPPLY SYSTEM
• MAINTENANCE LEVELS NOT IN PLACE
• NON-FLEET REPRESENTATIVE SUPPLY PROVIDED
 
Figure 9.   NAVAIR Identified Common Suitability Issues 
(AIR 5.1E Brief, 2004) 
  
This result supports the comment made by a former Commanding Officer 
for the Navy’s Developmental Test Squadron, VX-31.  When asked what he 
considered to be a deficiency in the way the Navy conducts developmental 
testing, he commented that the Navy does a great job testing the effectiveness of 
a system and identifying the goods and other aspects about a system’s war 
fighting capability.  Unfortunately, they generally fail to look at the entire spectrum 
of testing, which includes operational suitability. (Burris, 2004, interview)  He 
further added that in his early days in the T&E community, he had been involved 
in a program that failed to confront this very issue.  The program he referred to 
was the once highly classified Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) 
program.  He commented that while the program was technologically mature, the 
reliability issues led to multiple firing failures.  Each test failure was a result of 
different component failures.  Schedule delays and increasing costs eventually 
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resulted in program cancellation in December 1994.  Cost growth had gone from 
$728,000 per unit in 1986 to $2,062,000 in 1994 (then year dollars).  (Federation 
of American Scientists, 1998, ¶ 5).   
In a study of Army Programs that included the ADATS (LOS-F-H) Air 
Defense System, Avenger (Pedestal Mounted Stinger), OH-58D (AHIP) Scout 
Helicopter and the Apache (AH-64) Attack Helicopter, suitability problems were 
also noted.  In this study, recommendations to overcome the suitability shortfalls 
were provided. They include: 
• Early Attention to Technical manuals resulted in a more accurate 
product and led to fewer logistics support problems during operational 
test;  
• Technical manuals should always be a planned objective;  
• Contractor technical writers should be brought to the training and 
testing locations to correct technical manuals as problems are noted by 
the users;  
• All system training publications and manuals must be completed, 
reviewed, and selectively tested prior to the beginning of operational 
test;  
• User experience and training before operational test is extremely 
valuable; and 
• Training should be conducted at a proper point before operational 
assessment and should include prototypes and detailed mock-ups.  
    (Hoivik, 1997) 
Similar to the Army study, the NAVAIR study provided some 
recommendations, shown in Figure 10, for future PMs and testers to consider as 
they execute a test program. The recommendations are the result of analyzing 
over 64 naval aviation programs of which 10 were ACAT I Programs. 
 
AIR-5.1E ACQUISITION T&E DEPARTMENT
 
Recommendations
• USE LOGISTIC SUPPORT REPRESENTATIVE OF FLEET CONDITIONS
• RELIABILITY WILL NOT GET BETTER IN OPEVAL -- ATTAIN LEVELS IN DT FIRST
• PROVE EFFECTIVE WORKAROUNDS BEFORE OPEVAL
• PROVE SOFTWARE MATURITY IN DT
• AVOID ENTERING OPEVAL/FOT&E WITHOUT PREVIOUS OT
• ENSURE RELIABILITY, DOCUMENTATION, TRAINING AND BUILT-IN TEST ARE READY
• HAVE OPEVAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLAN FULLY IMPLEMENTED
• HAVE TRAINING PLAN FULLY IMPLEMENTED
• IF ISSUES ARE IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO OPEVAL/FOT&E, SECURE A WAIVER
• ALLOW TIME FOR DOCUMENTATION TO BE DEVELOPED AND CHECKED BEFORE OPEVAL
 
Figure 10.   NAVAIR Recommendations 
(AIR 5.1E Brief, 2004) 
 
C. LESSONS FROM OTHER PROGRAMS 
Program test strategies, both past and current, offer a tremendous amount 
of learning opportunities for future programs.  While each system presents 
unique challenges and is different in their mission and performance goals, their 
common successes and failures in the testing approach provide a basis for 
generic lessons learned.   
 
1. Hubble Space Telescope 
Launched in 1990, the Hubble Space Telescope, Figure 11, was a 
scientific effort that received worldwide attention.  This attention resulted in global 
embarrassment as the first images produced by the telescope were out of focus.  
There had been an inherent flaw in the lens system. This flaw, detected on Earth 
six years earlier, was a result of ignored data by engineers and testers.  National 
Aeronautic and Space Administration’s (NASA) review determined that if the 
proper ground test procedures had been in place, along with the proper process 
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to report and analyze the data, then this issue could have been rectified earlier, 
and at decreased cost and risk to the program.  (Cotterman et al., 2000, p.127) 
 
 
Figure 11.   Hubble Space Telescope 
 
Lessons learned: 
• Data analysis; 
• Marred failure analysis process; and 
• Inadequate ground testing. 
 
2. Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response Weapon 
The Navy’s upgrade to the Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) is the 
SLAM-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) program, Figure 12.  Designed to 
address the Navy’s requirements for a precision-guided Standoff Outside of Area 
Defense (SOAD) system, the weapon encountered continuous problems 
throughout its development and test cycle.  During development, the program 
failed to account for historical deficiencies, specifically concerning data link 
interference and the resultant impact to the displayed image presented in the 
cockpit videos.  As a result of this oversight, the maximum effective range from 





Figure 12.   SLAM-ER Weapon System 
 
 
Another factor that affected the program’s ability to effectively test was the 
relationship between the PM and the testing community.  The DT community, 
under much pressure from the PM, designed the tests to succeed rather than 
verify true system performance.  They augmented the targets to make them 
easier to see through the weapon’s seeker. They were testing for success and 
limiting knowledge gained.  This created an adversarial PM to tester relationship.  
During the independent OT, without target augmentation, five of the eleven 
firings were a success.  DT test expertise was also a contributing factor to the OT 
troubles.   
Test pilots and maintenance crews had become experts and 
intimately familiar with the test missiles.  Thus, they knew how to 
work around problems, such as when the video images on the 
target acquisition system froze…test articles were prepared and 
maintained to be in the best condition.  (GAO-00-199, 2000, p.40)  
The compensation experienced in this program is a general concern 
throughout the test community.  In a study conducted by LtCol Alford (USAF), 
where he evaluated the impact of test pilot compensation during aircraft 
acquisition programs, he stated,  
Test pilot compensation hides critical handling qualities cliffs that 
can lead to loss of an aircraft when encountered by less skilled  
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pilots.  This observation has vast ramification for test, evaluation, 
and development of all human interface systems. (Alford, 2004, 
p.23) 
Further factors that affected the SLAM-ER program included the instability 
in system configuration.  The system experienced configuration changes even in 
OT, thereby reducing confidence and knowledge gained. The SLAM-ER program 
also received unsatisfactory marks in operational suitability, specifically in 
reliability and maintainability.  These scores were a direct result of the Mean 
Time Between Operational Maintenance Failure (MTBOMF) criterion not being 
met and poor built-in-test (BIT) performance.  (AIR 5.1E Brief, 2004) 
An additional contributing factor to the struggles that the SLAM-ER 
program experienced relates to their test approach.  The program did not fully 
integrate an early operational assessment before proceeding to independent OT.   
Lessons learned: 
• Historical performance problems (feedback loop); 
• Testing for success; 
• Negative test culture; 
• Lack of an early operational assessment; 
• Performance compensation by test pilot and test maintainers;  
• Reliability/maintainability issues; and 
• Configuration stability. 
 
3. F/A-22 Raptor 
The F/A-22 Raptor, Figure 13, is an example of what can happen to a 
program’s requirements as it begins to drag out for an extended period of time.  
Since development began in 1986, the advanced fighter aircraft’s mission was to 
ensure future air-to-air dominance against the Soviet Union.  As the threat 
changed and the development schedule for the aircraft extended so did the 
requirements.  The USAF, in an attempt to save the program from the cutting 
floor, re-designated the aircraft from a single mission fighter to a dual role 
fighter/attack aircraft.  This change in mission brought new mission requirements 
to a struggling development and test program.  As of March 2004, GAO reported 
that these new requirements would require a budget increase of $11.7 billion. 
(GAO-04-597T, 2004, p.5) 
 
 
Figure 13.   F-22 Raptor 
 
Additional factors have contributed to the slow development and test 
effort.  The program managers and testers developed a very optimistic test 
strategy.  They assumed that there would be no failures in hardware or software 
during ground testing. As a result they did not plan in their schedule any time to 
repeat or re-fly test events.  They planned to always have an aircraft available for 
each scheduled test event, and they expected each event would provide 
productive information for the advancement of the program.   
Test planners did not effectively evaluate the maturity level of the 
technologies incorporated in the aircraft.  As a result, the development timeline 
extended reducing the available testing schedule and funding.  Moreover, as the 
program experienced various test failures, the overall test program required 
reorganization leading to a curtailed approach. As an example, funding shortfalls 
required the elimination of range resource products, designed to support the test 
program.   
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Avionics testing was reduced to approximately half to save schedule and 
cost.  To support this reduction, the program intended on combining multiple 
objectives to one test. This test approach has been negatively viewed by 
DOT&E.   
Never place your program at unnecessary risk by betting it on a 
single test…Any time you get into a situation where the outcome is 
going to be all or nothing, black or white, you probably need to 
rethink your test program. (Coyle, 2000, p.3) 
Further reductions in testing will occur with respect to live fire air-to-air 
testing.  Captive testing, rather than live fire testing, is now the intended strategy 
during IOT&E.  Furthermore, production representative finishes to meet stealth 
specifications had not been flight tested before full-rate production.  This 
increases the maintainability risk and is very similar to what the B-2 program 
experienced. (F-22 Raptor, 2001, ¶ 6) 
Speed of testing is another identified weakness for the program.    The 
Honorable Mr. Christie stated, “When the F-22 program fires but one missile a 
month in its test program, there is something profoundly wrong with the speed at 
which we can conduct testing.” (Christie, 2002, speech)   
Recently there has been concern that the F/A-22 program will not meet 
operational suitability.     
The F/A-22 program is not meeting its requirements for a reliable 
aircraft, and it is not using a knowledge-based approach. The Air 
Force established reliability requirements to be achieved at the 
completion of development and at system maturity.  As a measure 
of the system’s overall reliability, the Air Force established a 
requirement for 1.95-hours mean time between maintenance by the 
completion of development and 3-hours mean time between 
maintenance at system maturity. This measure of reliability 
represents the average flight time between maintenance actions. 
As of October 2003, the Air Force had only been able to 
demonstrate a reliability of about 0.5 flying hours between 
maintenance actions or about 26 percent of the development 
requirement and 17 percent of system maturity requirement. This 
has led to test aircraft spending more time than planned on the 
ground undergoing maintenance. (GAO-04-597T, 2004, p.8) 
Lessons learned: 
• Optimistic test planning; 
• Immature technology; 
• Data flow chain (slow test process); 
• Addition of new requirements (air-to-ground); 
• Stacking test events; and 
• Suitability issues. 
 
4. Theater High Altitude Area Defense Program  
The THAAD, Figure 14, is a mobile ground based missile system 
designed to hit and destroy incoming ballistic missiles.  This system along with 
the Patriot system complement each other with the THAAD working the higher 
altitude engagements and the Patriot engaging lower altitude systems.  The 
program has experienced classic T&E problems.   
 
 
Figure 14.   THAAD Missile System 
 
As the schedule slipped due to development problems, the program office 
began cutting test events. There was a reduction in ground testing events.  This 
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delayed identifying problems until flight test.  “Several failures in flight tests of the 
THAAD system were traced to problems that could have been revealed in ground 
testing.” (GAO-00-199, 2000, p.17)  Shipping and the integration of many 
subcomponents occurred without the necessary ground test verification.  The 
technology of the seeker was not mature enough to support the user needs, but 
due to schedule and the cost growth, the PM accepted the lesser technology and 
reduced the scope of the testing. (GAO-00-199, 2000, p.34)   This approach did 
not afford the opportunity to establish early system knowledge.  The immaturity of 
the seeker technology resulted in an unstable seeker configuration further 
hampering gaining knowledge about system performance.  In addition to 
supporting a reduction in testing, they accepted a reduction in test 
instrumentation used on the missile system.  This decision limited the test team’s 
ability to evaluate missile system failures, which occurred during firings two 
through nine.  The test community further developed a test plan strategy that was 
overly optimistic in hopes that technology would catch up throughout 
development.  
During their review of the program, the GAO conducted multiple interviews 
with program officials concerning the troubled programs.  Two very poignant 
comments were made concerning the test approach.  
Program officials acknowledged that they took many shortcuts in 
technology maturation, expecting to make up this knowledge during 
flight-testing. (GAO-00-199, 2000, p.34)   
According to program officials, the difficulty of the technology 
maturation process alone could not be accomplished in the time 
allotted.  To satisfy the early fielding date, program managers opted 
to omit fundamental ground and subsystem tests and use flight-
testing to discover whether the missile design would work.  When 
the flight tests proved unsuccessful, the early fielding date was 
postponed and the requirement was eventually deleted entirely. 
(GAO-00-199, 2000, p.51) 
Lessons learned: 
• Insufficient ground testing; 
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• Limited instrumentation; 
• Immature technology; 
• Optimistic test planning; and 
• Configuration instability. 
 
5. AGM-88D Precision Navigation Upgrade (HARM PNU) 
The HARM PNU, an international program, Figure 15, designed to 
incorporate an improved navigational software suit in the HARM weapon, 
increasing its geo-specificity, experienced cost and schedule overruns during the 
development effort.  As a result, the DT&E effort was de-scoped.  This de-scope 
led to a 44% reduction in flight test events.  With a cut in flight tests, the T&E 
team began to increase the number of test events for each flight.  The updated 
flight test schedule was success oriented and allowed for only two software 
updates with a projected four-week schedule impact.  Flight test events were 
scheduled approximately 10 days apart.  While executable, this schedule did not 
account for the actual 10-14 day data analysis process that would occur after 
each flight test event.  The original plan allowed for only a 3-4 day data 
turnaround time.  The international complexities and total data package size 
prevented smooth data transfers between the companies involved in the 
development effort.  On one occasion, to reduce the data flow chain, the test 
team sent a US engineer to a partner country to deliver the data from a flight test.   
The DT strategy did not capitalize on the important lessons learned from 
the Contractor T&E (CT&E) phase.  CT&E took six months longer than 
anticipated as a result of data analysis problems, flight test planning problems, 
data exchange delays, incomplete aircraft and weapon’s integration software, 
and subsystem interface problems.  Program management incorrectly concluded 
that since the CT&E phase took longer, there was greater knowledge gained 
about the maturity of the system, and as a result, the DT effort would go 
smoother.  During the DT test period, PM pressure necessitated testing to 
support schedules rather than when the system was ready.  This approach 
resulted in many flight test events that did not increase the knowledge base to 




Figure 15.   HARM Missile 
 
Other test strategy failures occurred with the integration of the navigational 
software and navigational hardware.  Each product, developed in a separate 
country, did not undergo subsystem integration testing before shipping to the US 
for full system testing.   The result of this stovepipe effort proved to be the 
downfall for the missile program.  The hardware and software systems did not 
function properly when integrated.  The failure to perform integrated subsystem 
ground testing, during the development of this software and hardware, resulted in 
insidious navigational problems.  As a result, the system could not achieve the 
system specifications and operational requirements, and eventually resulted in 
the conclusion of the program.  The test strategy also did not support an early 
operational assessment.  There was a plan to perform operational scenario 
testing for the last two firings, but with the program delays and slide in test 
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schedule, these firings were re-scoped to support the constantly changing 
software builds.  By the conclusion of the program, many suitability issues had 
not received the attention necessary due to the effectiveness problems.  Key 
suitability areas that were still deficient were documentation, training, and 
reliability.  
Lessons Learned: 
• Optimistic test planning (stacking test events); 
• Data flow chain; 
• Insufficient subsystems testing; 
• Inefficient ground testing; 
• Suitability issues; and 
• Schedule-driven rather than event-driven. 
 
6. DarkStar Unmanned Air Vehicle 
The DarkStar Program, Figure 16, was an ACTD designed to demonstrate 
the military utility of the unmanned aircraft.  Originally scheduled as a two-year 
program, it suffered a major setback after the aircraft crashed during its second 
mission.  The causes for the failures were a direct result of a poor program and 
testing strategy.  The termination of the program came as result of reduced 
funding support.  Cost and schedule growth had increased more than 100%.  
The program was marred for a variety of reasons.   
The DarkStar’s components and subsystems were not adequately 
validated before flight testing began.  PMs curtailed some testing 
earlier in the program to stay on schedule.  Limited knowledge 
about the aircraft’s performance contributed to the crash of the first 
test vehicle.  For example, the fuel system was not sufficiently 
instrumented or ground tested before flight tests began.  Some key 
sensor testing was deferred until after flight-testing.  Also, the 
contractor made extensive use of commercial components without 
testing or qualifying them for use on military systems…To save 
money, managers decided not to construct an “iron bird”, which is a 
physical replica of the aircraft’s hydraulics and mechanical 
subsystems…Problems surfaced during the first flight test that were 
not fully investigated and resolved due to time constraints.  Braking 
and flight dynamics problems were not resolved prior to the next 




Figure 16.   DarkStar Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
 
Lessons learned: 
• Limited instrumentation; 
• Insufficient ground testing; 
• Inadequate prototyping; and 
• Marred failure analysis process; 
 
7. B-2 Stealth Bomber 
While the B-2 Stealth Bomber, Figure 17, is combat proven, the testing 
community failed to fully test the system, and as a result, the USAF must deal 
with some cost drivers with respect to aircraft suitability.  Effectiveness testing 
was successful, but non-operationally representative environments provided the 
basis of most flight tests.  These tests, conducted in good weather, masked the 
true maintainability problems.   Exposure of these problems did not occur until 
after Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and post full-rate production.  Post IOC, 
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B-2s returned from training missions with damaged skins, reducing their stealthy 
characteristics.  “End result is that for every one hour of flying it takes 45 
maintenance hours to fix, on average.  Essentially only 33 percent of the aircraft 
can fly at one time.”  (Umansky, 2001, ¶ 11)  This is a lesson that the USAF 
should consider with their F/A-22 aircraft.   
 
 
Figure 17.   B-2 Stealth Bomber 
 
Lessons learned: 
• Non-operational test scenarios; and 
• Suitability testing. 
 
8. AIM-9X Program  
The AIM-9X Program, Figure 18, was a joint A/A weapon program that 
was designed to provide the aircrew with an off bore sight capability in the short-
range air-to-air arena.  The AIM-9X Program was a major upgrade to the existing 
weapon system.  The program had its struggles, but the former integrated 
product team lead said in an interview that the test strategy used poised it to 
handle the challenges that it faced.  Production Representative Missiles (PRM) 
went to the OT community early to build hours and support operational suitability.  
The OT community flew the weapons even if the missile was not part of a test 
event. Exposure of the system to many unscripted operational test events 
occurred during this time, affording the opportunity for excellent operator 
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feedback early in the program’s development effort.  This feedback was then 
folded into the weapon system, which greatly enhanced the final product. 
 
 
Figure 18.   AIM-9X Seeker 
 
The early involvement by the OT community further aided the 
development effort to meet operational suitability.  The OT maintainers 
recognized a major flaw in the weapon’s storage container.  This resulted in an 
early modification to the container.  Failure to capture this information before 
independent OT would have resulted in program delays. Another issue that was 
handled early in the program’s development was the safe-and-arm handle.  
Operational maintainers recognized a flaw in the design.  This flaw, had it not 
been corrected, would have prevented them from operating the handle with cold 
weather or chemical weapons gear.  (Converse, 2004, interview) 
The data flow chain, specifically the data analysis portion, took longer than 
desired.  Because of the multiple agencies involved in the testing, there was a 
long turnaround time during the envelope expansion phase.  There were four 
different agencies in four different locations responsible for evaluating the data.   
Despite some foresight in test planning, the program did suffer because of 
range support issues.  OPEVAL, despite early OT involvement, dragged out due 
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to airborne target problems.  This resulted in the AIM-9X program delaying live-
fire tests until QF-4 aerial targets became available.  This delay in aerial target 
availability highlighted a range infrastructure concern sited by DOT&E.  Targets, 
whether airborne, sea based, or land targets, are becoming more difficult to 
acquire.  Systems are becoming more precise and advanced in their ability to 
identify and track a target.  In some cases, they can discriminate based on actual 
target appearance.  Ranges do not have the funds to fully support higher fidelity 
target requirements to account for the advances in weapon capability.   (DOT&E, 
2004, p. 343) As a result, the financial impact that is incurred for higher target 
fidelity is typically transferred to the programs, which are already under funded.  
This drives a PM to push for less field testing. 
Lessons learned: 
• PRM early in the hands of the OT community can be beneficial; 
• OT maintainer involvement early will help in suitability compliance; 
• Data flow chain needs to be efficient; and 
• Availability of representative targets. 
 
9. Tactical Tomahawk  
The recent Tactical Tomahawk Weapon System (TTWS) test program, 
Figure 19, received unsatisfactory OT scores in the area of suitability.  The areas 
of concern were documentation and training. The highlights from the overview 
stated that the training was insufficient to support operations related to the 
upgrade of the missile system.  The documentation was unsatisfactory due to 
missing information or incorrect documentation.  (Duarte – TTWS PM, personal 
communication, June 4, 2004) Ironically, the program also received 
unsatisfactory scores in suitability during another upgrade effort in FY97.  During 
that test program, documentation, human factors, and reliability issues resulted in 
unsatisfactory test scores.  (AIR 1.6 Brief, 2000)    
 
 
Figure 19.   Tomahawk 
 
Lessons learned: 
• Unsatisfactory documentation; 
• Inadequate training; and 
• Not learning from historical performance. 
 
10. High Mobility Trailer  
Systems of all sizes can experience some of the most common problems.  
The Army High Mobility Trailer, Figure 20, developed in 1993, failed operational 
use.  The truck trailers encountered serious safety problems and damaged the 
trucks that were towing them.  The Army was required to purchase and then 
modify at a substantial cost. Analysis of this program failure indicated that the 
Army never conducted a field (operational) test before procurement. (GAO-00-




Figure 20.   High Mobility Trailer 
 
Lesson learned: 
• Non-operational testing. 
 
D. ACADEMIC INSTRUCTION 
Timeless problems plague testers as they evaluate a weapon system.  
Figure 21 lists some common areas of lessons learned from multiple Army 
programs.  Created in 1996, the inclusion of this dated information is to highlight 
the commonality of problems between the services and indifference of time with 
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Major Response Categories Were:
• Schedule Problems 
• Problems with the Acquisition Process
• Test Culture Problems
• Resources Management
• Changes in Requirements
 




1. System Requirements 
Clearly communicating system requirements, Figure 22, and Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) to the entire test team will result in a system being 




Figure 22.   Views of Swing CONOPS 
(Cotterman et al., 2000, p.113) 
 
Although simple, this illustration highlights the importance of clearly 
defining and communicating the requirements. System requirements can be user 
requirements, functional/capability requirements, and performance requirements.  
They are then flowed into design or system specifications.  Demonstrating 
specification compliance, while one of the DT community’s test functions, does 
not guarantee compliance with the operational requirement, as shown in Figure 





























Figure 23.   Requirements Relationship 
(Owen, 2004) 
 
Early involvement by the OT community and continuous communication 
between the DT and OT communities will reduce the risk of the DT community 
performing tests that do not effectively evaluate the system.  Multiple sources of 
documentation capture the requirements and operational needs to support 
system development, Figure 24.  Under the new acquisition guidelines, the Initial 
Capabilities Document (ICD) is equivalent to the Mission Need Statement (MNS), 
and the Capabilities Description Document (CDD) and Capabilities Production 
Document (CPD) replaced the ORD.   
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Figure 24.   Requirements Documentation Sources 
  
Figure 25 illustrates where the key acquisition documents fit into the acquisition 
process.  The figure further shows the evolutionary acquisition process and the 
incorporation of the increment builds during the product development process.  In 
an incremental process, “a desired capability is identified, an end-state 
requirement is known, and that requirement is met over time by development of 
several increments, each dependent on available mature technology.”  
(Wascavage, 2004) This acquisition process allows the testing community to test 
and evaluate to a specified level of capability for each respective increment.  
While the overall system requirements do not evolve, the PM, user, and tester 
understanding of the incremental capabilities that will be introduced at various 
periods is essential to effectively establish the test strategy.  Demonstration of 
controlling and testing to incremental requirements occurred during a major 






















ICD – Initial Capabilities Document 
establishes the need for a material approach 
to resolve a capability gap.
CDD – Capabilities Development Document 
provides the operational performance 
attributes to design the proposed system.  
Includes Key Performance Parameters 
(KPP) that will guide the development, 
demonstration and testing of the current 
increment.
CPD – Capabilities Production Document 
narrows the performance parameters into 
more precise estimates for the production 
system.  
Figure 25.   Requirements and Acquisition Process 
(DoDI 5000.2, 2003, p.3) 
 
During the testing for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, there was a strong 
desire to show and test the full capability of this weapon system.  Testers 
overcame the PM and personal pressures to test beyond the scope of the initial 
test effort.  Built upon a strong evolutionary development process, the program 
incorporated FOT&E into its test strategy to ensure continued testing after 
demonstrating basic combat capability.  In an interview with CAPT Steve Burris, 
F/A-18 Advanced Weapons Lab (AWL) military lead during the testing, he stated 
that there was a “box” that the platform was originally required to perform to for 
the first test phase.  The team continuously reminded each other not to stray into 
putting more in the box than what was required.  One example of staying inside 
the “box” involved the testing of only 10-weapon load-out configurations.  While 
hundreds of possible weapon load-outs exist, the Fleet user, through an 
operational executive committee, picked their top 10 weapon load-outs.  These 
weapon load-outs defined the first phase of testing.  Now after Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC), the aircraft continues to qualify other configurations beyond the 
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top 10.  Keeping the requirements focus for a particular phase of test inside the 
“box” proved to be a successful test approach as the aircraft met the deadline for 
first deployment.   
 While the F/A-18E/F development effort was successful, product 
development timelines for DoD generally run behind schedule, and as a result, 
CONOPS or the threat assessment can change before fielding a system.  
Therefore, there is a tendency to add to the basic requirements of a system to 
maintain its viability.  This can create a cascading effect, Figure 26, potentially 











































System with Known & Unknown Deficiencies
 
Figure 26.   Requirements Instability 
   (Owen, 2004) 
An example of not maintaining requirements is the Navy’s Radio 
Frequency Countermeasure System.  This system, designed to work on an F/A-
18E/F, met the initial requirements for the Navy.  The scope was a five-year 
development effort.   Before start, during a joint review, the USAF determined 
they wanted to participate in this program and as a result instituted a new set of 
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requirements that were more demanding than the Navy requirements.  DoD did 
not approach this change from an evolutionary position and attempted to 
combine both Services’ requirements for the first build.  The late USAF 
requirements precipitated a program slip.  (GAO-01-288, 2001, p.32) As a result, 
the F/A-18E/F was not able to deploy with the intended EW system and 
eventually deployed with a less effective system.  The original system is still in 
development seven years after inception.   
While the concept of requirements “creep” is not one that should be 
encouraged, there are times that altering or accepting a change is best for the 
program.  “That combination—increased understanding and improved 
technology—often leads to the conclusion that the system’s requirements need 
to be changed or expanded.  This is not a bad thing…” (Ward, 2003, p.32)  
Reaffirmed by VADM Bennitt (Ret) in an article presented in the ITEA Journal, he 
stated,   
But any effort to adjust requirement parameters is generally viewed 
as a program failure, or as an effort to circumvent the acquisition 
system, rather than as an acknowledgement of the capability that is 
realistically achievable within an expected timeframe.  Hard 
objective data must be provided to support a program manager’s 
decision to deliver timely upgrades to the Warfighter, even if that 
means moving higher-risk capabilities into a later development 
spiral.  (Bennitt, 2004, p. 7)  
The PM and the DT test community must evaluate any requirements 
changes that are made throughout the development cycle and only under the 
strictest guidelines accept a change/alteration to the requirements.  Requirement 
changes require an impact assessment to the test effort.  If there is a significant 
improvement and the test resources are available to support the change with 
minimal program impact, then an alteration may be acceptable.  
  
2. Special Test Requirements 
Test requirements also present some unique challenges.  Throughout a 
test program, various agencies require different information from a specific test 
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event.  A test strategy should consider what the data requirements are for each 
interested test agency. As a tester, planning for the multitude of test data 
requirements early in a developing program will prove very beneficial throughout 
the entire test evolution, even during the OPEVAL period.  
Engineers and testers should work together early on to ensure that 
key components are easily instrumented or readily provide 
necessary test data.  In some cases, this is simply a matter of 
approaching the development with testing in mind.  In other cases, 
creative methods may be required.  Progress should be aided by 
the fact that, as information technology becomes more available 
and pervasive in systems, the ability to collect, export, and analyze 
test data will dramatically improve. (Sega, 2003, p.7)  
Instrumentation data requirements are generally the concern of the DT 
community, as the OT community typically does not allow instrumentation gear 
installed within their systems.  The operational community is interested in testing 
the production representative system, as delivered to the Fleet/Field.  With the 
combination of reduced resources, increased test complexity, and growing desire 
to integrate DT and OT testing, vigilance by the DT community to understand the 
instrumentation needs for the OT community early in the test-planning phase is 
necessary to avoid delays to test.  The Army TACMS testing in 1990 experienced 
this problem.  Before the start of IOT&E, the OT community desired to have their 
Fleet representative launchers instrumented.  The contractor for the launcher 
refused to perform the request, and the OT community was required to hire and 
independent contractor to design and install instrumentation. This eventually 
resulted in a test delay of two weeks.  A lesson learned from this event was 
pointed out in the after action report.  “Additional instrumentation of the systems, 
if needed at all, must be completed before start of test to avoid delays; might be 
best to plan for test instrumentation in the design of the system.” (Dillard, 1990, 
p.57)  In a draft white paper, the author of the after action report and participant 
in the tests reflects on this event and the importance it has on the testing 
strategy.  “Instrumentation is the single most important consideration that our 




F. UNDERSTAND THE OT PLAYBOOK 
During the building of the DT strategy, the DT community should evaluate 
the type of testing expected by the OT community.  Understanding the OT 
strategy will help the DT community create a more robust test effort.  The DT 
team can gain this knowledge via the Service-unique Operation Test Director 
(OTD) Guidebook.  In the Navy, this document clearly identifies the operational 
community’s strategy in planning and executing their tests.  The document 
discusses two primary areas for program evaluation—effectiveness and 
suitability. 
Operational effectiveness is the overall degree of mission accomplishment 
of a system when used by representative personnel in the environment planned 
or expected for operational employment of the system considering organization, 
doctrine, tactics, survivability, vulnerability, and threat. (COMOPTEVFORINST 
3960.1, 2004, p. G-8) The building blocks to operational effectiveness are shown 
in Figure 27.   The data and observations collected during testing are compared 
against the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and the Critical Operational Issues 
(COI), which are defined in the TEMP.  COIs are defined as, “the critical aspects 
of a system’s operational effectiveness and operational suitability that are 
intended for resolution during OT. (COMOPTEVFORINST 3960.1, 2004, p. G-3) 
MOEs are defined as, “a measure of operational success that must be closely 
related to the objective of the mission or operation being evaluated, for example, 
kills per shot, probability of kill, effective range, etc. A meaningful MOE must be 
quantifiable and a measure to what degree the real objective is achieved.” (Helm, 
2002, p.10) These test metrics are developed during the test planning process 








Figure 27.   Operational Effectiveness Building Blocks 
 
Operational suitability, highlighted in earlier sections, is another area 
evaluated by the OT community in the assessment of a system that has been an 
area of neglect in a product’s development effort.  The OTD Guidebook defines a 












• Wartime Usage Rates 
• Manning Requirements 
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• Natural and Environmental effects and impacts 
 
Operational suitability is the degree to which a system can be placed 
satisfactorily in field use with consideration given to the criteria listed above. 
(COMOPTEVFORINST 3960.1, 2004, p. G-9) 
The OTD Guidebook also provides information concerning the two types 
of testing that the OT community can choose.  They are scenario-oriented or 
operation-oriented testing.  (COMOPTEVFORINST 3960.1, 2004, pp.6-7)  
Because the operational use of weapon systems changes with the changing 
operational situation in the battlefield, the OT community tends to test in a 
scenario oriented testing environment.  In this type of testing, the OT community 
will develop scenarios that meet or match current tactics and procedures, as well 
as present a realistic threat environment.   Early determination of unique OT 
resource requirements, because of scenario testing, can be captured in the 
TEMP if the DT community plans early with the OT community.  Early planning 
can increase the probability that the correct resources will be available to support 
the OT effort.  Furthermore, the DT community can understand the OT strategy 
and test to a similar level at the appropriate time in the development phase.  This 
will increase system performance knowledge when in an OT representative test 
environment. As pointed out earlier, gaining early knowledge about system 
performance, similar to the commercial industry practice, can help reduce 
program risk. 
 
G. DATA SUPPORT / ANALYSIS 
Throughout a test program the desire for data is unquenchable.    
Engineers, managers, and testers look for the information that the data streams 
and charts produce.  This valuable information offers insight into the health of a 
program.  With the reduction in the range infrastructure due to budgetary cuts, 
this necessary requirement has proven costly when not available.  “Obsolete 
facilities and equipment increasingly fall short of data collection requirements.” 
(Gehrig et al., 2002, p.58) telemetry (TM) needs, data turnaround time, 
availability of range instrumentation systems, and the available frequency 
bandwidth all play important roles in data collection and analysis. 
Reducing the time in the data flow chain will aid in increasing the tempo of 
testing, which is one of the recommendations from DOT&E.  By reducing the 
development testing timeline through shortened data flow processes, a reduction 
in the overall product development timeline is achievable supporting Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld’s desire to “minimize development time.” (Dulin, 2001, p.75)  





∆ Time ∆ Time
 
Figure 28.   Data Flow Chain 
 
Identifying the respective testable requirements is the first part of the flow 
chain.  Once identified, the test team determines the best means to test and 
capture the data.  This data capture can be from telemetry streaming information, 
video displays, developmental tester notes, or some other medium.  Once 
captured, a test team must determine the process to proceed to the next test 
event.  This process can be a real-time voice report from the tester, or it may 
involve time-consuming engineering reviews.  The final phase of the flow chain 
involves analysis.  This is the phase where the test team confirms the results, 
especially if poor performance or unexpected results were observed and a root 
cause must be discovered.  For a test team, the strategy should be to reduce the 
overall time it takes to complete the data flow chain.  Highlighted in this research 
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were two programs that demonstrated both extremes to the data flow chain 
process.  For one of the contractors in the JSF program, a mobile and self-
contained TM collection van was used to allow real-time processing and analysis.  
This afforded stepping through test events in a rapid fashion, thereby maximizing 
the available test time.  On the other end of the data flow spectrum was the 
HARM PNU program.  This international program did not have an efficient data 
process after data capture and was plagued with a long data analysis process.   
Understanding this data flow chain and working to minimize the timeline 
will become more important as weapon system complexity and the amount of 
data continues to grow.  Poor data analysis processes will slow the T&E 
schedule and could result in very little being learned from each test.  As VADM 
Bennitt (Ret) states, 
 …the tyranny of the data avalanche.  The F/A-22 and the F/A-
18E/F development programs pushed the envelope with regard to 
the challenges of gathering and analyzing massive amounts of 
data.  Data will be acquired by several test articles, operated at 
multiple sites.  Bring on Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)!  Fourteen test 
aircraft, four distinct “customers,” multiple sites, highly instrumented 
aircraft and engines and growing international participation-the data 
“take” will be counted in hundreds of terabytes.  The test 
community must be focused, disciplined and fully integrated into 
every aspect of the development process or it runs the risk of 
drowning in the data.  (Bennitt, 2004, p. 7) 
 
H. INTEGRATED T&E 
Throughout the research, there have been numerous references about 
involving the operational community earlier in the test process.  Former DOT&E 
Dr. Coyle presented the question, “Are you including the Operational Testers up 
front?” during a speech in 2000 at Fort Belvoir.  (Coyle, 2000, p.5) This can prove 
to be very difficult but the perseverance by the DT team to involve and inform the 
OT community on test decisions can save program time and money.  NAVAIR 
recognizes the importance of integrating T&E.  As a result, the initiation of a pilot 
program with the latest F/A-18 software upgrade effort has begun.  The 19C 
Operational Flight Program will develop an integrated test plan with a test 
strategy to use Integrated Test and Evaluation (IT&E).  The primary objective is 
to efficiently execute software upgrade testing with a smart test planning 
approach between the DT and OT communities.    Figure 29 is a general 
representation of the level of effort that will be expected from the respective 
agencies throughout testing.  Highlights to the IT&E concept include sharing of 
test and range assets, developing a common test plan, and conducting a shorter 
independent operational evaluation.  Within the T&E philosophy, there will be a 
minimization of repeat test events, thereby accelerating product development, 
identifying and correcting potential operational problems earlier in the 
development and test cycle and ultimately saving program cost.   
Integrated Test Conduct - General











ITE Level of Effort
 
 
Figure 29.   Integrated Test Conduct for Each Agency 
 
Figure 30 shows a lower functional level with increased detail regarding 
the responsibilities and types of tests for major test phases. Parallel DT and OT 
efforts will occur to support this integrated approach.  The complexity of the tests 
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begin to increase as the program matures, and it is during this time that the OT 
level of effort increases.  The overall objective is to support:  
• Quicker test process; 
• Capability-based testing; and 
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Figure 30.   IT&E Level of Effort Timeline 
 
I. SUMMARY 
The challenges that face DoD in testing are not new.  The quick review of 
10 programs in this research spotlights recurring themes in DoD testing: 
• Insufficient ground testing; 
• Insufficient system instrumentation and data analysis; 
• Testing in non-operationally representative environments; 
• Hardware and software configuration instability; 
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• Very little focus in operational suitability issues; 
• Optimistic test planning; 
• Schedule driven testing rather than event driven testing; and 
• Negative test culture. 
As a DT team begins the process of developing a strategy to effectively test a 
product, they must understand these historical problems.  This will afford them an 
opportunity to mitigate the probability of repeating the same mistakes.   
 Testers should also understand some of the enabling drivers that can 
affect the test planning and execution process.  This includes understanding and 
clearly communicating the requirements to all participating agencies.  Once 
understood, the test team, through constant communication with the PM, must 
ensure that the requirements are stable.  Failure to keep the baseline 
requirements in a “box” will predicate changes to the test effort and eventual 
program development timeline increases.  If changes are required, they must be 
evaluated to determine the impact to the test program.  Working within the 
evolutionary acquisition system, the inclusion of an FOT&E phase to support 
programmed increments and changes provides the least risk.   
The DT community must understand that satisfying the design 
specifications during DT does not ensure OT success.  Understanding the test 
methodology in the operational evaluation will provide the DT community insight 
to effectively test a system against specifications as well as operational 
requirements.  Achieving this is possible by following a few guidelines: 
• Involve OT early and throughout the process; 
• Communicate / understand / confirm system requirements; 
• Translate requirements to test events; 
• Communicate DT and OT resource requirements early; and 
• Generate and evaluate scenarios in DT at the OT level as 
defined in the OTD Guidebook. 
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Many of the test deficiencies researched and identified are a direct result 
of the basic DoD philosophy and test approach.  There is a resistance to learn 
about a system’s capability early in its development.  The driving factors, aside 
from budget, are the immaturity of emerging technologies to support the 
developing product, and the emphasis placed on passing or failing a test rather 
than learning.   
With the new acquisition policies, and emphasis on evolutionary and 
integrated testing, there is some promise of change.  NAVAIR and 
COMOPTEVFOR are initiating a movement toward integrated testing.  While the 
outcome and benefit of such an initiative will not be known for some time, other 
programs should begin to evaluate how they are conducting their test programs 
and compare and contrast it with the integrated process in order to more 








































IV. APPLYING THE PROCESS TO AARGM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Research to this point has offered insight into DoD test philosophy and the 
differences from the more successful commercial sector philosophy. In addition, 
lessons learned from past DoD studies and previous development programs 
were discussed.  This information was presented to increase the knowledge base 
for an individual who may be tasked with developing the test strategy for a major 
acquisition program.  One such program that is in need of developing a robust 
and effective strategy is the AARGM Program.  Within this chapter, there will be 
a discussion of the weapon system and the test approach that the team is either 
taking or should consider.    
 
B. EVOLVING THREAT 
Currently in the United States military weapons arsenal, the HARM is the 
only air-to-ground anti-radiation weapon deployed on tactical aircraft in support of 
the SEAD mission.  Technology and tactics advancements associated with 
enemy Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) have made the SEAD mission of 
locating, targeting, and engaging these threats increasingly difficult.  As 
demonstrated in Kosovo and Iraq (Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom), 
air defense units are becoming more mobile and are effectively employing 
countermeasures such as Emissions Control (EMCON), blinking, and shutdown 
to further complicate the SEAD mission.  US force structure dynamics demand 
efficiency in conducting the SEAD mission to reallocate multi-role aircraft to the 
strike mission.  Because of increased political sensitivities to collateral damage 
and civilian casualties, more effective target location and discrimination are 
required.  HARM guides towards the emitted radiation of enemy radar systems; 
however, it cannot autonomously yield the target location/discrimination 
necessary to meet current Positive Combat Identification (PCID) Rules of 
Engagement (ROE) for current day operations.  Additionally, after launch the 
HARM provides no definitive indication of weapons effectiveness or location of 
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impact to support re-attack decisions or the Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 
process.  Current HARM employment and effectiveness continue to be limited by 
simple enemy tactics and the high potential for collateral damage in operations. 
 
C. MISSION REQUIREMENT 
A number of official documents and forums cite the requirements for 
increased capabilities for reactive or concurrent Joint Suppression of Enemy Air 
Defense (J-SEAD).  A key document, which highlights these requirements, is the 
Combat Mission Need Statement (MNS) CAF329-92 for Lethal J-SEAD that calls 
for the reactive destruction of enemy IADS using on-board and off-board 
sensors.  The AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) 
further addresses key shortfalls based on the results of the J-SEAD Joint Mission 
Area Analysis and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s (JROC) approved 
Theater and Air Missile Defense (TAMD) MNS.  Current HARM shortfalls were 
also discussed and documented at the Strike Weapons Operational Advisory 
Group (OAG) in 1998 and 2001, and at the Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM) 
Steering Committee (ASC) in November 1998.  Although the above-mentioned 
initiatives addressed the J-SEAD needs for reducing the timeline for attack on 
IADS, it did not address key issues such as responsive re-attack, second sensor 
confirmation in support of ROE, and rapid and reliable weapons impact 
assessments as part of the BDA process.  These three issues were the genesis 
of the Quick Bolt (QB) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD).  
These operational issues and requirements are detailed in the United States 
European Command (USEUCOM) QB Functional Requirements Document 
(FRD).  The AGM-88E AARGM Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for 
this new SEAD weapon, which takes into consideration all the above 
requirements for Time Critical Strike (TCS), ROE, BDA, was approved in June 




D. BASELINE AARGM PROGRAM 
The AGM-88E weapons system, Figure 31, currently in SD&D is an 
upgrade to the current HARM system.  The system builds upon the lessons 
learned from the AARGM ATD and the USEUCOM-sponsored QB ACTD. 
The AARGM ATD initiated development of an enhanced seeker for the 
existing HARM airframe.  These enhancements included: 
• Weapon Accuracy—Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation 
System (GPS/INS) for mid-course guidance during missile flight to 
target; 
• Autonomous Target Location—Improved Anti-Radiation Homing 
(ARH) seeker field of view, sensitivity, and direction-finding 
accuracy with autonomous target detection, identification, tracking, 
and target ranging; 
• Improved Lethality—Active Millimeter Wave (MMW) radar, 
providing terminal homing even in the presence of emitter 
shutdown; and 
• Reduced Collateral Damage/Fratricide—Inclusion of GPS/INS 
supports the establishment of geographic boundaries.  Aircrew can 
now prevent weapon from impacting within a region, called an 
Impact Avoidance Zone (IAZ) or exiting a defined boundary, called 
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Figure 31.   AGM-88E AARGM Missile 
 
Although the AARGM ATD initiative addressed some of the needs 
identified in the MNS and Fleet forums, it did not address responsive re-attack, 
second sensor confirmation in support of ROE requirements, and rapid and 
reliable Weapons Impact Assessment (WIA) indications.  The QB ACTD by 
teaming with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) achieved these 
requirements.  Building upon the AARGM ATD, the QB ACTD introduced a major 
enhancement to the weapon system.  This was the inclusion of the national 
systems architecture.  The national systems introduced a net-centric capability to 
the weapon system and the tactical cockpit.  This provided: 
• Improved Situational Awareness (SA)—360° reception and display 
of threat systems provided by the Intelligence Broadcast Service 
(IBS) and the ARH receiver; 
• Improved Targeting—Reception between national systems 
sensors, ARH receiver, and onboard aircraft sensors enable 
autonomous multi-source correlation; and 
86 
87 
• BDA Support—Missile WIA transmitter injects accurate and timely 
information in the national architecture supporting BDA for re-
attack/combat assessment. 
The QB ACTD test program was conducted from November 2002 until 
September 2003 and included two firings.  During the tests, the program 
successfully demonstrated the capability of transmitting WIA information across 
national systems to a China Lake strike cell.  The information sent by the weapon 
before impact was received by a ground station and then rebroadcast across the 
national architecture where it was received by the strike cell.  The information 
was timely, accurate, and supported re-attack decisions or combat assessment.   
The second major capability demonstrated was enhanced targeting and 
increased SA within the tactical cockpit.  Achieved by the inclusion of an 
Embedded National Tactical Receiver (ENTR), the receiver allowed targeting 
information broadcast through the IBS to enter into the tactical cockpit, thereby 
providing essential targeting system information.  Demonstrated in the last firing 
scenario, presented in Figure 32, the aircrew, through their cockpit displays, 
identified, handed-off, and fired upon a correlated target facilitating a successful 
engagement.  This complex scenario included two ambiguous RF targets. The 
primary target was shutdown while the weapon was in-flight to demonstrate the 


















– Geographic ARM Kill Box Mission 
– AOR and IAZ geographic areas mission planned
– Target Emitter shuts down prior to missile impact
– RF ambiguous emitter remains on
– National SIGINT and real-time RF correlated
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Figure 32.   Quick Bolt 2 Firing Scenario 
 
E. T&E STRATEGY 
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This advanced and technically challenging development effort is a product 
of the evolutionary acquisition process.  The program entered into the acquisition 
world as an ATD.  The primary focus of this effort was to evaluate the seeker 
technology and determine if it would be feasible to achieve the desired 
performance.  At the time of inception, the TRL for the enabling technologies 
each rated a three. (Brady – Deputy AARGM PM, personal communication, July 
9, 2004) The key enabling technologies for the program were the advanced ARH 
receiver and the MMW terminal seeker.  The program concluded after five 
successful firings with an assessment that the technology was feasible.  While 
feasible, there were questions about its producibility and whether the system 
could support the Sea Power 21 initiative.  The program office then entered into 
an ACTD.  During this phase, the maturity of the technology evolved.   The 
contractor also was able to learn about the unique producibility requirements.  
Because of the combination of the ATD and the ACTD programs, the maturity of 
the technology at the time of a Milestone B decision improved to a TRL of six.  
Currently, according to the deputy program manager, the TRLs for the two 
technologies are at a seven. (Brady, personal communication, July 9, 2004)  
The program’s initial test strategy is defined in the TEMP.  During the 
formulation of the TEMP, the test team, composed of members from the program 
office and the development and operational communities, flowed down the 
requirements listed in the ORD and translated them into Critical Technical 
Parameters (CTP) and COIs, as shown in Figure 33.  The CTPs are the technical 
parameters, as defined in the specifications that the DT community will use as 
their primary metrics.  The COIs were carefully developed from the Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Suitability (MOSs) to represent 













Figure 33.   Requirement Flow for TEMP Development 
   
During the flow process, MOE and MOS, defined in the ORD, were 
evaluated for testability.  The test program schedule was developed and 
recorded in the document.  The DT period began in March 2004 and will 
conclude in March 2008.  The DT phases of test are very structured.  The first 
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phase is contractor-led and is designated DT-B1.  It covers the period from 
March 2004 until October 2007. During this phase of testing, the primary 
objective is to develop software algorithms, integrate the hardware specifically 
located in the guidance section and control section, and perform subsystems 
testing.  The second phase of developmental testing is government-led, covers 
the period from March 2007 until March 2008, and is designated DT-B2.  During 
DT-B2, the government will test the complete weapon system and the integration 
between the weapon and the aircraft.  The OT community will be given an 
opportunity to assess the potential suitability and effectiveness of the system 
during the Operational Assessment (OA), which occurs eight months into the DT-
B2 phase.  This assessment will be one input into the Low-Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP) decision.  The DT-2B phase will continue throughout the OA.  It is the 
intent of the test strategy to incorporate lessons learned from the OA into the 
weapon development program.  At the completion of DT-B2, the system will enter 
OPEVAL, which is currently scheduled for June 2008. 
With the program more than one year into SD&D, the current policies and 
plans for the T&E Integrated Product Team (IPT) are beginning to take form.  
Two areas of focus define the current T&E strategic approach.  The first area 
involves the test planning process, while the second area deals with test 
execution.  The former is critical to the success of the program.  To support this 
effort, the AARGM T&E IPT has created Test Plan Working Groups (TPWG).       
TPWGs facilitate the integration of test requirements and activities 
through close coordination between the members who represent 
the material developer, designer, community, logistic community, 
user, operational tester, and other stakeholders in the system 
development.  The team outlines test needs based on system 
requirements, directs test design, determines needed analyses for 
each test, identifies potential users of test results, and provides 
rapid dissemination of test and evaluation results. (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2001, p.68) 
The AARGM System TPWG includes all stakeholders to the program.  
They presently meet twice a year to discuss test requirements and the progress 
made satisfying those requirements.  The current membership is follows. 
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• DOT&E—Provides independent assessments for programs to the 
Secretary of Defense, USD(AT&L), and Congress. 
• N091—Issues policy and procedures for the conduct of Navy T&E. 
• COMOPTEVFOR—Navy's sole independent agency for operational 
test and evaluation. 
• VX-9—Operational Test Squadron. 
• VX-31—Developmental Test Squadron. 
• ARM Weapons Office—Developmental Engineering Group. 
• PMA-242—Program Office. 
• ATK Missile Systems Corporation—Primary Contractor. 
• Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC)—Command ensures 
Interoperability KPPs are satisfied. 
• National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)—Provides the technology 
to support National Targeting. 
• National Security Agency (NSA)—Provides the necessary protocol 
to use the national systems. 
• F/A-18 Advanced Weapons Lab (AWL)—Develops the aircraft 
interface software. 
• Range Support—Responsible for targets, data collection, 
instrumentation, and range airspace.  
There are also lower echelon TPWGs that concentrate on specific areas 
to support test.  These TPWGs have a reduced membership and focus on 
developing strategies to overcome specific risks such as target and range 
limitations or asset utilization.  The AARGM TPWGs are currently addressing the 




The terminal seeker for the AARGM system presents some unique 
challenges for target requirements.  The upgraded anti-radiation missile requires 
two primary features from the targets.  The first is a valid RF signal for the ARH 
receiver and the other is operationally representative Radar Cross Sections 
(RCS).  While the former is a legacy HARM requirement and is typically 
producible at current test ranges, the latter requirement creates some difficulty.    
DOT&E sited in their FY03 report on AARGM that there are not enough procured 
targets within the range infrastructure to support the needs of the AARGM 
program. (DOT&E, 2004, p. 123) In an effort to address this challenge, the T&E 
IPT established a Targets Working Group (TWG) dedicated to target support.  
Their primary responsibility is to evaluate the current asset availability within the 
existing range infrastructure and develop a strategy to expand it in order to 
support the AARGM test effort.  In the short existence of the working group, they 
have created a matrix of all available threat systems within the US range 
infrastructure.  This list, while not complete, identifies the location of the system, 
type (real or simulated), and operational status. Additionally, in an effort to meet 
some target requirements defined in the ORD/TEMP, as well as those requested 
by the OT community, they have let small contracts with research universities 
and NAVAIR range departments, specifically at China Lake, to begin the process 
of repairing and in some cases developing the threat systems.  They have also 
evaluated the use of overseas ranges. Engaging the operational community 
early, to solidify their target needs and requirements, has allowed the TWG and 
the T&E IPT to identify commonality between the contractor, DT, and OT 
communities’ needs.  This will allow the test team to more efficiently use the 
limited target resources.  Learning from the ATACMS test effort, the TWG will be 
identifying the requirements to verify, validate, accredit, and instrument select 
targets.  This constant dialogue between the contractor, DT, and OT 
communities will help prevent late test target requirements from delaying test 
execution.  While it is necessary to accredit the OT targets, the current plan is to 
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accredit all test targets, thereby increasing the possibility for the OT community 
to leverage some DT testing with their own.   
  
2. Range  
Testing against a variety of background scenarios will be required to 
demonstrate the increased system lethality.  This is difficult since most ranges 
that contain simulated or realistic Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems are 
located in a desert environment.  While searching for acceptable targets, the T&E 
IPT has been concurrently evaluating possible locations to create operationally 
representative environments in unrepresentative test areas.  Current policy, 
based on safety concerns, necessitates firing this weapon within a very limited 
number of test ranges.  These ranges are China Lake, Utah Test Range, and the 
two sea ranges on the east and west coast.  A fifth range, located in Roosevelt 
Road, Puerto Rico, closed recently due to civilian encroachment.  As a result of 
the available ranges, the background environments are limited to desert and sea.   
As stated in the ORD and TEMP, the weapon system will need to be tested and 
evaluated against other operationally representative environments to verify 
system performance.  The Range TPWG is currently working with the Targets 
TPWG to identify possible alternatives to the current challenge.  Similar to the 
targets challenge, consideration is being given to use allied range resources.  
Other proposals are to augment the target environment at the desert ranges to 
reflect the other background environments.  Each consideration brings 
challenges.  Regardless of the approach, these two TPWGs will need to continue 
to actively involve the OT community as well as DOT&E to ensure that the 
background scenarios will be operationally acceptable. 
 
3. Personnel 
DSB sited in their 1999 study that rotating personnel within the Test and 
Evaluation organization is a contributing factor to DoD’s poor T&E performance. 
Their recommendation, 
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Establish a stable team made up of users, developers, testers and 
appropriate contractors called a Combined Acquisition Force (CAF) 
to streamline the acquisition process for ACAT I programs.  The 
CAF should be formed once a need is identified and remain in 
place throughout the acquisition process.  (DSB, 1999, p.4) 
Although the AARGM program is an ACAT 1C program, it does not have a 
CAF.  The program does contain some very experienced testers, specifically 
within the government.  They are also well within the retirement age.  The 
program is currently financially limited and does not have the ability to bring in 
young government test engineers to mentor.   This has created a program 
concern that the loss of key test personnel before the completion of the program 
will adversely affect the test effort.   Recognizing this concern, the T&E IPT 
focuses on documenting all decisions, processes, and results in an official 
configuration managed process.  Recording the who, what, when, where, why, 
and how of a decision or event, and correctly archiving it for others to view will 
help minimize the disruption that is inevitable as the personnel within the T&E 
team change.  Through this effort, mitigating the possibility of not addressing 
historical deficiencies, similar to the SLAM-ER program, is possible.        
 
4.  Operational Involvement 
Building upon the recommendations from past studies and lessons from 
other programs, the AARGM T&E IPT has actively pursued the early involvement 
of the operational community.  This process began during the ATD and ACTD 
programs.  The current operational organizations that have been directly involved 
in the test planning process since the first TPWG, which began the development 
process for the TEMP, were DOT&E, N091, VX-9 and COMOPTEVFOR.  VX-9 is 
responsible for executing the operational test, while COMOPTEVFOR acts as the 
policy manager and ensures the necessary planning and documentation are in 
place.  Current successes for the AARGM T&E effort as a result of working with 
the operational community early: 
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• Redefining the KPPs/MOEs/MOSs to ensure testability; earlier 
definitions as written in the ORD were either ambiguous or not 
testable; 
• Resolution on the number of live firings and the number of live 
warhead shots; 
• Establishment of a dedicated operational assessment during the 
developmental test period; 
• Establishment of three DT assist test phases;  
• Establishment of the weapon instrumentation requirements during 
OT; and 
• Understanding of the operational test and financial resource 
requirements during the OA and the OPEVAL. 
Open and continuous communication ensured the establishment of 
positive relationships and the understanding of various test requirements levied 
by the operational community.  Although successful to date, there are other test 
issues requiring definition and direction.  The involvement of the entire OT 
community is essential to ensure effective testing.   
One such issue is that firing scenarios must be generated for both DT and 
OT.  DOT&E had stated the number of test firings available is insufficient to 
support the test effort. (DOT&E, 2004, p.123) To overcome this risk, the test 
team must clearly define the requirements that are to be tested during the firings.  
To do so they must use dendritics. 
Dendritics is a tool to develop and see relationships.  The process 
of creating the dendritics facilitates the identification of critical 
issues, Measures of Effectiveness, Measures of Performance, and 
data requirements.  The data requirements then facilitate 
developing the test plan for a system.  By identifying the data 
requirements necessary to answer the questions posed in the 
dendritics, testers can formulate tests to capture the necessary 
data.  (Helm, 2002, p.8)    
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Early involvement by the operational community affords the DT community 
an opportunity to reflect on environmental considerations during test events.   
When programs do poorly in operational tests, frequently it is 
because they permit themselves to encounter for the first time 
some operational environment or requirement that they have never 
tried before, or have tried before in developmental testing, but only 
unsuccessfully.  This can include environments like rain, dirt, dust, 
or wind; or it can be countermeasures, realistic threats, or realistic 
operational environments.  For example, the Army’s SADARM 
(Sense and Destroy Armament/Armor) program was doing fine in 
developmental tests in the clean desert at Yuma Proving Ground, 
but when they got into the operational test with interesting terrain, 
trees, and realistic countermeasures, they didn’t do so well. (Coyle, 
2000, p.3)   
The early involvement of other agencies and commands affords the 
opportunity to address unique planning requirements.  The net-centric enabling 
technologies require the involvement of the NRO, NSA, and JITC.  These 
agencies have requirements not typically considered in basic weapons programs:   
• National scheduling 
• National targeting information 
• Data requirements 
Another issue is the data flow chain. Establishing agreement on the data 
sharing throughout the test process is essential.  Leveraging the IT&E concept 
will afford increased opportunities to share data between the DT and OT 
communities. 
Delivery times for production-representative missiles are another issue.  In 
addition to the delivery times, the DT community is currently working with DOT&E 
to clearly establish the definition of production-representative systems.  During 
the early TEMP development efforts, there was a discrepancy between the two 
agencies’ interpretations.  By engaging the DOT&E early, there has been time to 
develop a strategy.  At the time of this research, the strategy proposed has not 
been officially accepted by DOT&E.     
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Another concern is the agreement on the TM section requirements for the 
OT community.  Currently there are two versions for the weapon’s telemetry 
sections.  One provides a higher fidelity of data but incorporates a non-
production representative filter in the weapon.  The other provides less 
information but maintains the integrity of the production-representative 
configuration.  The DT community is currently working with the OT community as 
well as DOT&E to maximize the use of the higher data rate TM sections during 
OT.  This will offer increased system performance knowledge throughout the test 
effort. 
Establishing an integrated T&E effort that will more efficiently use the 
limited range and financial resources is also desirable.  One proposal 
recommends removing one firing from the OA.  The reason is that, based on the 
current contractor delivered software schedule, the release of full functionality 
software occurs just before the start of the OA.  This will not afford the DT 
community time to conduct the necessary preliminary tests thereby increasing 
risk for a successful outcome from the OA.  With the immature software, there 
would be limited knowledge gained from a second firing.  Allocating it into a later 
integrated test firing with more mature hardware and software offers an 
increased opportunity to learn more about the system performance.   
The creation of the developmental test scenarios is benefiting from the 
early involvement of the operational community and its inputs.  At a recent 
operator’s (user) meeting, the AARGM IPT lead requested that the Fleet subject 
matter experts send training scenarios that include the use of ARM weapons.  
The intent is to use these Fleet training scenarios as a foundation for the DT 
firing scenarios.  Scripting tests the way the user will fight with the article offers a 
plethora of potential knowledge about the system’s maturity.  Where an 
operational scenario cannot support a live-fire event, captive testing will be 




5. Managing Requirements 
Requirement stability is an important aspect for the establishment of a 
secure test strategy.  “Change in requirements was identified as a major problem 
for T&E…difficulties in defining test requirements made test planning and the 
conduct of tests more difficult and expensive than originally estimated.” (Hoivik, 
2000, p. 36)  The AARGM T&E IPT continues to face emerging requirements to 
demonstrate increased capability.  The program, originally divided into three 
evolutionary phases, was combined into one phase.  In the original acquisition 
strategy, the WIA capability and the national targeting capability were product 
improvement initiatives.  As program pressure to provide increased capability 
grew during the Milestone B decision, the program was re-scoped and the 
phases combined as a baseline capability.  This decision increased the focus of 
test and evaluation without the benefit of time or funding.  Complicating the 
situation, the re-scope decision was made without the involvement of the test 
team. 
Attempting to minimize requirements creep, the T&E IPT is increasing 
their dialogue with the PM.  This has offered opportunities to express concerns 
about funding and schedule, when additional system capability is being 
considered.  The team is also working with the contractor’s systems engineering 
team.  The systems engineering team is using the DOORS® engineering tool to 
flow and track operational and technical requirements.  DOORS® is a 
requirements management tool designed to capture, link, trace, analyze, and 
manage a wide range of information to ensure a project’s compliance to specified 
requirements and standards.  (Telelogic home page, retrieved August 29, 2004) 
A by-product of this tool is a matrix that can be used by the T&E IPT to develop a 
test point matrix.  The value that this provides is a clear relationship path to a test 
event and the requirement.  If requirements are added without the T&E IPT’s 
knowledge, it will be reflected in the computer generated matrix.  This tool also 
will allow the T&E IPT to clearly define when a specification/requirement is being 
tested and by what agency (i.e., contractor or government DT). The AARGM test 
team is adopting the lessons learned from the F/A-18E/F test program.  This 
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program was successful because of their strict adherence to the baseline 
requirements during the initial development and test effort.   
 
6. PM and Tester Relationship 
The distrust between the PM and the tester that has been identified in a 
variety of references and sited in this research will consciously be avoided.  
While different personalities will migrate into the PM and testing community 
throughout the effort, open and honest communication has proven and will 
continue to prove effective.  Additionally, averting or minimizing conflict is 
possible if the T&E IPT follows adherence to recording decisions and accurately 
tracking actions between the two groups. The T&E IPT can further minimize 
conflict by identifying very early the desired test schedule and objectives for each 
of the test events.  Establishing the entry and exit criteria for test events early in 
the planning effort, and getting PM approval, will provide the T&E IPT a solid 
foundation to work from throughout the test phase especially during time 
sensitive test periods.  This process is currently beginning within the T&E IPT, as 
they begin to define the objectives for the DT firings and the scope of the OA.   
 
7. Suitability 
The AARGM T&E IPT, through the Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) IPT 
is actively pursuing any areas that could present difficulty during the T&E phase.  
Historically operational suitability has proven to be a source of program failures 
during the OPEVAL phase of test.  “The Army has seen that 80% of their 
systems have not met 50% of their reliability requirements in operational test.” 
(Umansky, 2001, ¶9) Suitability encompasses a variety of areas, which are 
evaluated by the operational community.  With the requirements clearly defined 
within the OT test guide and the TEMP, the DT community has actively pursued 
a roadmap to ensure compliance.  Key areas of interest include aircrew and 
maintenance training and support, reliability, and maintainability.  These have 
been areas of weakness for previous HARM development efforts.  As a result, 
they are receiving increased attention early in the development phase. 
100
Currently the ILS team has conducted meetings with operational 
maintainers and users to identify concerns.  Application of lessons learned from 
the AIM-9X program will prove beneficial.  As stated earlier in the research, the 
AIM-9X program identified major shortfalls early in the development phase by 
incorporating the OT community.  Active utilization of ILS modeling tools, such as 
the NAVAIR-developed Audit Trail, has recently identified a requirement 
discrepancy between the system specifications and the ORD. (Chapman, 2004) 
As a result, a recommendation to modify the system specification has been 
requested to the PM.   
  
F. SUMMARY 
The AARGM TEMP, officially signed by DOT&E on August 12, 2004, 
clearly states the challenges faced by the T&E IPT. 
We reviewed and subsequently approve the attached AARGM 
TEMP No. 1651, dated June 10, 2004.  This is a success oriented 
test program; however, performance shortfalls may require 
additional test assets to ensure an adequate test and the 
successful execution of operational mission scenarios.  (OSD 
Memorandum, 2004) 
Added to those comments are the program risks previously recognized by 
DOT&E. 
• Test range infrastructure does not exist to adequately assess the 
full capabilities of the design with regard to target discrimination. 
• Limited number of missiles available during testing.   
       (DOT&E, 2004, p.125) 
These are realistic challenges, sited by an organization that has a holistic 
view of all of DoD test programs.  While challenging, they are surmountable.  The 
AARGM test strategy is based on a careful assessment of: 
• Current AARGM program requirements; 
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• Involvement of all agencies related to weapon development, test, 
and use; 
• Understanding of available range resources; and 
• Understanding of DoD program lessons learned. 
These assessments are based on the research that was used to support 
this thesis.  Table 1 presents the challenges identified within this research, and 
the current mitigation strategy adopted by the T&E IPT to address those 

























Table 1.   Strategy to Overcome AARGM Challenges 
 






AARGM T&E Element Mitigation Strategy Some Research Support Areas Section of Thesis
Targets -Current Resource Availability (US and Foreign) -DOT&E Study, AIM-9X Program II
-Integrated Test Team
-Targets Working Group
Range -Evaluation of Range Complexes (US and Foreign)
-BRAC, Range Encroachment, 
DOT&E Study II
Personnel -Documentation and configuration control of Decisions, Processes and Results -Commercial Philosophy II
-DOT&E Report, DSB Study
Operational Involvement -Early Involvement at ATD / ACTD Level -Several Past Studies and Findings I, II, III
-Inclusion of OT and DOT&E in original test 
planning process
-DSB & SAIC Studies, NAVAIR 
Study
-Test Plan Working Group -SLAM-ER, Army Cargo Trailer
-Integrated Test Team
Managing Requirements - 
System and Test -Integrated Systems Engineering Team
-Several Past Studies and 
Findings  II, III
-Integrated Test Team (OT/DT/DOT&E) -F/A-18E/F, F/A-22, ATACMS Program
-Communication -Boeing Lesson Learned
-Use of commercial systems engineering 
tool  
PM and Tester Relationship -Communication -Commercial Test Philosophy II, III
-Establishing Exit and Entry Criteria -DSB Study, SLAM-ER Program
-Documentation of Decisions
Suitability -ILS Modeling Tools / Audit Trail -AIM-9X Program III




A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
DoD is developing CONOPS for the future battlefield that demands the 
procurement of technologically advanced and highly integrated systems to 
support the Warfighter.  These systems, in development or in a conceptual 
phase, will require a product development approach that ensures they end up in 
operational use, on schedule, within cost and meeting all performance objectives.  
This approach is the evolutionary acquisition approach.  “Evolutionary acquisition 
is an approach that delivers capability in increments, recognizing, up front, the 
need for future capability improvements.  The objective is to balance needs and 
available capability with resources, and to put capability into the hands of the 
user quickly.” (DoDI 5000.2, 2003, p.3)  With this approach, T&E faces new 
challenges in their mission.  It: 
• 
• Requires more flexible test planning to deal with undefined 
thresholds; 
 
• May require more testing to insure no adverse effects on earlier   
capabilities; 
 
• Complicates logistical support and evaluation of suitability; 
 
• Requires constant coordination between user, developer, and 
testers; and 
 




Because of these new challenges, PMs must embrace the important role 
that T&E plays within their program.  Recognizing that T&E is more than a single 
phase on the development schedule will enhance the product development 
process.   
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Testing is an essenti s engineering 
processes. Too often, DoD has viewed testing as a disconnected 
single event or milestone through which systems must pass.  
that begins on day one and continues 
, repeatable, and disciplined manner; 
t, to subassembly, to subsystem, to system, to whole 
 sible and as often as affordable to find and 
on of the systems engineering council to develop test 
 and timely information exchange of 
objectives and test results; and 
 Take the time to ensure all parties (developer, contractor, and 
        (Bodmer, 2003, p.68) 
al component of the system
Testing should be a process 
throughout the design life of any system.  This is especially true 
when one considers the new evolutionary acquisition model. This 
model embraces the concept of spiral development and 
encourages rapid technology insertion.  In this model, testing is 
critical to producing and improving overall systems by integrating 
knowledge about the impact of each technology insertion into the 
development cycle. (Sega, 2003, p. 7) 
Testers further should recognize that they now play a larger role in the 
process and work to establish the necessary processes to effectively contribute 
to the weapon system development.  There are five principles that the tester and 
the PM should accept as they embark on this teaming venture. They should: 
• Develop meaningful and applicable test objectives, and adhere to 
them in an orderly
• Use the closed loop systems engineering approach, from concept, 
to componen
system test; 
Test as early as pos•
correct problems before they become too costly; 
• Involve the user, developmental tester, and operational tester in the 
initial formati
objectives to ensure continuous
•
government operational testers) thoroughly understand the system 
mission requirements and agree on how the system will be tested, 









environment, which includes ranges, capabilities, and personnel, 
• T&E Training – Providing the necessary tools for a successful T&E 
 challenges 
• E Efforts – Stovepipe approaches to T&E do not 
rly in the planning 
d afford time for resolution without 
affecting the program schedule.  DoD must globally recognize and 
No contractor involvement in the operational test phase will hinder 
acquisition streamlining, because the recovery period after the test 
will be made longer.  The contractor will have to wait until the end 
of the test before any fixes can be applied and tested.  This will 
Recognizing the role of T&E and acceptance and adherence to princ
ed to improve it will mitigate the current trend seen in each Services p
ional test results.  Other areas that the DT&E community can im
o strengthen weapon system development include: 
• Range Infrastructure Capabilities – A Warfighter does not ente
battle without clearly understanding the battlefield.  To do so w
lead to defeat.  A tester must understand the range reso
and effectively use what is available and quickly highlight the 
limitations.  Understanding the limitations early will afford time to 
develop alternative methods of test; 
effort starts with training the workforce.  Tester and PMs must be 
adequately trained in the field of T&E to understand the
that they will face.  This training should also afford them the 
knowledge of past program efforts; and 
Integrated T&
foster a successful program.  The DT community must actively 
pursue the involvement of the OT community ea
of a test program.  Understanding the testing needs of the OT 
community and validating decisions made by the PM or the DT 
community will reduce expending limited resources.  In addition, it 
will identify any conflicts early an
fully support the integration of test.  With limited resources, 
contractor, DT, and OT test phases should leverage from one 
another to reduce repetition.   
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a system.  Folding their experiences into the DoD test process will enhance 
govern
• 
 fear of failure.  While the 
commercial sector has supported this approach because of lessons 
•  
promote effective communication among the various organizations 
• 
While re global, they also can afford the 
AGM-88E program guidance to effect
develo  this 
progra sitive 
make the total test time longer and more expensive.  The total 
acquisition period will also be longer, again raising total program 
cost.” (Stoddart, 2001, p.5)  
The commercial industry has learned a great deal about effectively testing 
ment test efforts. These include: 
Knowledge based test approach – The concept of testing a 
developing system to a high level of fidelity early will offer keen 
insight into the maturity of the system.  The DT community must 
resist the urge to delay complex testing until later in a program’s 
product development schedule for
learned, DoD has not.  With the complexity of systems increasing, 
this concept will become the distinction between successful and 
unsuccessful programs; 
PM, tester, and contractor relationship – The test team must
involved in the test process.  Program foundations built upon 
positive communication will reduce the negative relationship 
between the tester and the PM. This approach will promote 
aggressively handling problems earlier in the test cycle; and 
Lessons-learned forum – DoD does not offer a means to easily 
learn lessons from other program efforts.  While some information 
is available, it requires a dedicated effort, like thesis research, to 
gather the data.  DoD needs to consider establishing an improved 
forum to distribute T&E lessons learned. 
the above recommendations a
ively test the system during the 
pment phase.  Practices that have already been established within
m include the early involvement of the operational test community, po
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commu f the 
range  or a 
path ahead for currently identified T&E concerns, other practices require 
adoption: 




ms.   





This re  effort 





the lessons from past programs; 
nication with the PM and contractor team, and an identification o
resource limitations.  While these efforts have ensured early resolution
• Define the integrated testin
• Establish Operational Test requirements for targets and 
instrumentation; 
PM acceptance to accelerate the complexity of scenario-based 
testing; 
Resistance to accept any new system requirements during the test 
phase; and 
Establish an internal T&E training program to include T&E lessons 
learned from other progra
p fo recommendations, when complete, require recording in the TEMP.  
re that all involved in the program’s development effort understand 
st strategy. 
OSED FURTHER STUDY 
search was originally designed to discuss the AGM-88E T&E
ent ays to ensure success during OT.  During the research phase, it 
rent that the scope was going to expand in order to understand the 
 situation with testing.  It also became apparent that the entire 
d not be fully evaluated.  As a result, there is a variety of follow-on 
sibilities: 
• Evaluate the impact that effective training can have on the T&E 
community.  With the continuously changing acquisition 
environment, it is imperative that the workforce understands the 
documentation and practices that support the T&E effort as well as 
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within naval aviation acquisition.  As this approach is new, T&E 
y is going to 
implement this concept into a pilot program associated with a 
ance and the key enabling concepts for the IT&E 
•  the practices and processes used by the AARGM T&E 
 ventured and evaluate if the accepted practices have 
 
success is to understand the system, the operational 
environment, and the lessons learned from others who have come before.  
Failing to recognize the importance of the latter will lead to repeating similar 
sible program cancellation.  The DT 
community plays a tremendous role in t





• Analyze the Integrated T&E Process and identify how this approach 
to testing will influence the acquisition process.  COMOPTEVFOR 
and VX-9 are the driving forces behind the integrated test approach 
documentation does not reflect the process. The Nav
software development effort for the F/A-18.  An analysis of the 
program’s perform
effort would prove beneficial to future programs; and 
Evaluate
IPT.  Faced with many challenges, explore the direction the 
program has
resulted in a positive T&E program. 
C. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Testing a developing system in DoD can be a challenging and rewarding 
experience.  The key to 
mistakes resulting in inefficiency and pos
he success of the program.  They must 
fully understand the program and its requirements.  Their test planning strategies 
will be the basis of evaluating the product before going into operational test. If 
they should fail to effectively identify performance or suitability issues, the 
chances for success decline. The challenges facing the AARGM T&E IPT team 
are tremendous.  The AGM-88E weapon sy
t S D system.  With this improvement, there are increased T&E 
here are many challenges, and the T&E team must clearly identify 
icate them to the PM.  In addition, they must continue to refine their 
to ensure executing in the most effective and efficient manner.  The  
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hte expecting to have the capability in 2009, and it is the responsibility 
M Team to deliver the product on time and with all performance 
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